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NOTES
REBUILDING THE SAFETY MECHANISM:
DOES 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) VIOLATE THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS?
Michael Buescher*
This Note examines the government motion requirement of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and section 5K]. 1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from a
separation of powers perspective. The issues discussed include whether
requiring authorization from the prosecutor before a sentencing judge can
consider a defendant's cooperation when determining whether to grant a
downward departure below a mandatory minimum sentence violates
separation of powers. Building on the concerns of past commentators and
recognizing that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are likely here to stay,
this Note proposes that, in order to protect the perception of integrity in the
criminal justice system, Congress should revisit current sentencing policy
and address perceived shortcomings in the allocation of sentencing power
between judges and prosecutors.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Defendant Z is arrested in the Southern District of New
York for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute. The amount of
narcotics involved triggers a substantial mandatory minimum sentence.
Based on the amount of narcotics and Defendant Z's relevant sentencing
factors as laid out in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the government
then determines what to charge. The prosecutor presents Defendant Z with
the following options: (1) go to trial, where Defendant Z will face the
tough mandatory minimum, a likely conviction, and where the prosecutor
will recommend the maximum sentence allowed by the Sentencing
Guidelines, or (2) cooperate with the government by offering information
on other criminals, possibly testifying at trial, and in some cases even
returning to the street to work for the government, all in the hopes of
receiving a coveted 5KI.1 letter for substantial assistance recommending
*J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1999, Wesleyan
University. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor James A. Cohen for his
insightful comments and suggestions throughout the editing process. I would also like to
thank Professors James E. Fleming and Daniel C. Richman for their additional
conversations, insights, and critiques.
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that the judge impose a more lenient sentence.1 The only catch? The 5K1.1
letter is not guaranteed because the prosecutor determines when substantial
assistance has been provided and will not disclose the information that he or
she already has. 2 Furthermore, the amount of cooperation that rises to the
level of substantial assistance lacks uniformity across the U.S. courts of
appeals and is undefined by the legislature. Indeed, absent the 5K1 .1 letter,
the sentencing judge has no authority to impose a sentence lower than that
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines based on Defendant Z's
cooperation if the prosecutor does not authorize the downward departure.3
Finally, in the Southern District of New York, Defendant Z will also have
to confess to all other crimes that he may have committed in the past,
exposing himself to an even harsher sentence. 4 So, Defendant Z, what will
it be?
The Sentencing Guidelines are entrenched in our criminal justice
system. 5 These guidelines have created a sentencing system that places
incredible emphasis on cooperation with the government. 6 The executive
branch's near total control under the current sentencing scheme-both to
charge and determine the sentence of defendants in mandatory minimum
cases involving cooperation-violates the separation of powers doctrine. 7
When the executive branch is given virtually exclusive power to bring a
charge that carries a mandatory minimum sentence and has the sole
1. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917, 919 (1999) (noting that "[e]very
defendant or target of an investigation must contemplate cooperation with federal
authorities"). Without such a letter, defendants, particularly in narcotics cases such as this,
will be subject to lengthy incarceration and rigid mandatory minimum sentences. See id. at
926.
2. Id. at 928 (noting that "substantial assistance has come to be defined as giving the
government information that it does not already possess").
3. Id. at 919 ("[I]t is particularly within the purview of the federal prosecutor to make a
decision as to whether she will seek a downward departure based upon her determination
that a defendant is deserving of the benefit that truthful cooperation provides.").
4. Id. at 928-29, 928 n.50 (indicating the extent to which the defendant places himself
at the mercy of the sentencing judge's implicit understanding of the cooperation system).
5. See Jos6 A. Cabranes, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 271, 271 (2000) ("The Guidelines have become deeply
entrenched.... In light of the entrenchment of the Guidelines, we should have no illusion
that they will be easily discarded or supplanted in the near future. The question, therefore, is
whether the present system should be modified or reformed to achieve greater coherence,
consistency, accountability, and, ultimately, a higher level of justice. At stake here is the
very legitimacy of our system of criminal justice."). Although Judge Cabranes's article was
written five years before the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which invalidated the mandatory application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, Justice Stephen Breyer's recent opinion in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2463-64 (2007), reaffirming the validity of the Sentencing Guidelines as a proper reflection
of statutory mandates, demonstrates the continuing validity of Judge Cabranes's
commentary.
6. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 919 (noting that "[t]here is significantly more
cooperation under the guidelines because greater stakes increase the incentives to cooperate
with the government").
7. See infra Part III.A.
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discretion to determine whether a judge may consider a defendant's
cooperation in order to grant a sentence below that mandatory minimum,
there appears to be a plain violation of the separation of powers doctrine of
the U.S. Constitution. The circuit courts, however, have overwhelmingly
determined that because judges still have the power to determine the final
sentence-even absent a downward departure for substantial assistance-
there is no separation of powers violation.8  Past commentators have
presented compelling arguments regarding the unfairness to criminal
defendants and the threat to individual liberty inherent in a criminal justice
system that sanctions a blending of powers in investigating, charging, and
sentencing a crime. 9 Unfortunately, as evidenced by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Vargas,'0 and the subsequent denial of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court, courts appear unpersuaded by defendants' arguments that as
deference to prosecutorial discretion has increased and more defendants
seek to cooperate, the practical effect of the current sentencing scheme that
gives prosecutors the only key to downward departures for substantial
assistance (cooperation) violates separation of powers."I
In Mistretta v. United States,12 the Supreme Court noted in dicta that
Congress's potential assignment of judicial responsibilities to the executive
branch would raise constitutional questions. 13 At that time, however, the
Court did not directly address whether executive control of sentencing in
mandatory minimum cases would violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Sixteen years later, in United States v. Booker,14 the Court recognized that a
potential separation of powers problem could arise from excessive
prosecutorial power over sentencing factors.' 5 It is admittedly difficult,
absent a blatant constitutional violation, to square this language with a
criminal justice system that does allow nearly unlimited prosecutorial
discretion. 16 Although the Supreme Court has recognized a potential
problem with such discretion, ultimately the lower courts have determined
that the solution lies with the legislature and not with the courts. As the
8. See infra Part II.A. 1-2.
9. See infra Part II.B.4-5.
10. United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL 3228787 (2d Cir. Nov. 7,
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3027 (2007) (mem.).
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
13. Id. at 391 n.17.
14. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
15. Id. at 257 (explaining that prosecutors exercise a power vested in judges when they
"decide, based on relevant information about the offense and the offender, which defendants
merit heavier punishment"). The Court, however, did not reach the issue of whether
mandatory guidelines violated the separation of powers doctrine.
16. See infra Part I.A.3. Selecting someone for prosecution based solely on her race is
one example. Additionally, there are other areas of adjudication-such as grand jury
procedure, which does not require the prosecutor to present potentially exculpatory evidence
when seeking an indictment-that are universally accepted despite their superficial
appearance of unfairness.
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criminal justice system moves closer to operating as a strict system of
contract law, where defendants bargain away rights in the hopes of
receiving a lenient sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor,
American society should be increasingly alarmed at the lack of due process
afforded to criminal defendants. To put it another way, because most
defendants will never go to trial, the only process they receive will be at the
hands of the prosecutor. As previous commentators have noted, allowing
an interested party to effectively determine a defendant's sentence raises
serious issues about the integrity of the criminal justice process. 17 Indeed,
it is doubtful whether this near total deference to the prosecutor-from
investigating to charging to plea bargaining to sentencing-can be
considered any process at all. In response to these concerns, it seems that
Congress should be obligated to revisit sentencing policy and either correct
the balance of power issues or, at the very least, reaffirm the current policy
and offer justifications for what is currently perceived by some as an
imbalance of sentencing power.
Currently, prosecutors continue to wield complete discretion to charge a
defendant with a crime that carries a mandatory minimum sentence, and
also enjoy nearly unchecked discretion to grant motions for substantial
assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and section 5Kl.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines. 18 The government has asserted that this combination of power
does not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.' 9 It seems more
accurate to assert that in a strict separation of powers system, allowing the
government to control both charging and sentencing should be a violation.
This assertion, however, ignores the reality that in most areas of
government, such as the administrative branch, there is a long tradition of
blending powers. This Note proposes that while joining the power to
control sentencing with the executive power to charge is unconstitutional
and contrary to the framers' intent, due to the courts' historical deference to
prosecutorial discretion 20 and a functionalist blending of government
powers in criminal law cases, 2 1 this issue is more properly addressed by
Congress. As a recent New York Times article suggests, unlike the Supreme
Court, the now Democratic Congress may be more willing to revisit
sentencing issues. 22
Part I of this Note discusses the history of sentencing in the United
States, as well as the competing approaches to separation of powers
analysis in the Supreme Court. This part also examines prosecutorial
discretion to make a substantial assistance motion under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and section 5Kl.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the past legal
17. See infra Part II.B.5.
18. See infra Part I.A. 1.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hildenbrandt, 378 F. Supp. 2d 44, 46 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
20. See infra Part I.A.3.
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. See Lynette Clemetson, Judges Look to New Congress for Changes in Mandatory
Sentencing Laws, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2007, at A12.
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challenges to those provisions. Part II presents a recent argument revisiting
the application of the separation of powers doctrine to the government
motion requirement for substantial assistance. This part discusses recent
cases in which defendants have argued that a prosecutor's sole discretion
both to charge and grant substantial assistance motions violates the
separation of powers doctrine. This part also brings together academic
support and objection to the use of the current sentencing scheme's
substantial assistance motion and the government's triggering mechanism.
Finally, Part III of this Note suggests that a prosecutor's unfettered
discretion both to charge and control sentencing in mandatory minimum
cases is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, whether analyzed
from a functionalist or a formalist constitutional framework.23 Part III
asserts that continuing to allow a violation of the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants in this subset of sentencing cases is no less of a
violation simply because the prosecutor does not control sentences in all
cases. This part, however, suggests that, while it would be appropriate for
the courts to invalidate the current government motion requirement for
substantial assistance as a violation of separation of powers, due to the
courts' valid concern for the integrity of the criminal justice process and the
reality that prosecutorial discretion is deeply entrenched in the current
system, it is more likely that the courts will ask Congress to reassess the
government motion requirement for substantial assistance.
This Note suggests that in the interest of avoiding a fundamental
violation of individual liberty by allowing the prosecutor, an interested
party in the litigation, to both charge a criminal defendant and control her
sentence, Congress should recast the government motion requirement to
allow for input from both the prosecutor and the sentencing judge. This
Note advocates hightened justification requirements for prosecutors who
choose not to authorize a downward departure based on a defendant's
cooperation. Additionally, if Congress was to allow judges to consider a
defendant's cooperation as grounds for a downward departure, this Note
advocates requiring the sentencing judge to describe with particularity why
such a departure would be justified. Recasting the government motion
requirement in this way would prevent the pooling of charging and
sentencing power in the executive branch and return some or all sentencing
discretion to the judiciary. Furthermore, as previous commentators have
suggested, Congress should define with particularity what is required for a
defendant to receive a downward departure for substantial assistance.
I. SENTENCING IN AMERICA AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Part L.A of this Note addresses the historical role of judges in sentencing
and the development of sentencing reform leading to the current Sentencing
23. It is not, however, the purpose of this Note to determine which framework is better.
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Guidelines, including the creation of Guidelines section 5K1.1 and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e), as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Booker v.
United States24 that invalidated mandatory sentencing guidelines. Part L.A
also discusses past legal challenges to section 5KI.1 and the increased
importance of cooperation in light of the deference to prosecutorial
discretion. Part I.B of this Note introduces the two analytical
frameworks-formalism and functionalism-employed by the Supreme
Court when analyzing separation of powers cases.
A. Sentencing in American Criminal Law
Prior to the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines, judges exercised broad
discretion in sentencing. 25  Judges were "authorized to impose
indeterminate sentences of any length" so long as they sentenced within
statutory limitations. 26 This flexibility in sentencing represented both an
uncertainty about the purposes of criminal sanctions and the historical ideal
of rehabilitating offenders. 27 The judge's task was to allocate punishment
fairly based on each individual crime and each individual criminal. 28
Critics complained of "disparity" in sentencing based on illegitimate
considerations that influenced judicial discretion. 29 In the early 1970s,
Judge Marvin E. Frankel described judges' sentencing discretion as "almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping." 30
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act31 in response to
calls for reform. 32 The Act created the Sentencing Commission, charged
24. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
25. See Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 19-20 (1998).
26. See The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5Ki.]
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1503, 1505 (2001)
[hereinafter Proposal on 5Kl.1]. These limitations generally represented only a maximum
fine or prison sentence.
27. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing historical values that factored
into criminal sentencing).
28. Id. The difficult question has always been defining proportionality. Depending on a
judge's perception of proportionality, sentences could vary based on the importance given
both to blameworthiness and the amount of injury or harm. Under the Guidelines, judges
frequently received information that illuminated a defendant's reputation or character but
had little to do with innocence or guilt. Id. at 14-15.
29. Id. at 31 (discussing criticisms of judicial discretion influenced by the temperament
of the judges as well as the characteristics of the defendant); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
41-50 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-22 (complaining of sparse
guidance in sentencing discretion).
30. See Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 5 (1973) (stating
that unchecked judicial discretion "in the fashioning of sentences [is] terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law").
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000).
32. See Proposal on 5K1.1, supra note 26, at 1505 n. 14 (noting Judge Marvin Frankel's
arguments for reform); Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1,
51 (1972) ("I propose that there be established a National Commission charged with
permanent responsibility for (1) the study of sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the
formulation of laws and rules to which the results of such study may lead ....").
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with creating guidelines to structure sentencing while promoting uniformity
by allowing judges minimal discretion to depart from the structure only for
aggravating or mitigating circumstances not already considered by the
Sentencing Commission. 33  In an effort to meet these twin goals, the
Sentencing Commission drafted the Sentencing Guidelines. 34 In their basic
form, the Sentencing Guidelines created a sentencing grid. On the y axis,
similar offenses are grouped together and assigned similar sentencing
values, creating the base offense level and providing the initial sentencing
range.35 On the x axis, a defendant's criminal history category, based on
previous criminal activity and submitted in the presentencing report, then
increases the defendant's sentence within the initial range. 36 Finally, the
sentencing judge is asked to consider other limited, defendant-specific
factors that might weigh on the final sentence. The end result is a
computation of the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range.37
Two years later, in 28 U.S.C. § 994(n), Congress required the Sentencing
Commission to create an additional basis for departure to account for a
defendant's substantial assistance to the prosecution. 38  The result was
section 5Kl.1, a Federal Sentencing Guidelines policy statement that
provides, "Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from
the guidelines. '39 Notably, however, this provision only allows for a
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) ("The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described."). Subsequently, in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005), the Supreme Court invalidated § 3553(b) and the mandatory status
of the Guidelines as violating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
34. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (2000)). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are published annually
in the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual.
35. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified
Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1342, 1353-56 (1997) (describing the charge-
offense-based system of the Sentencing Guidelines).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2000) ("The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect
the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed,
including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to
take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense."); see also Proposal on 5K].1, supra note 26,
at 1505.
39. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K.l (2005). To determine the appropriate
level of departure, the judge may consider the following factors that appear in the Guidelines
manual:
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated
that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's
evaluation of the assistance rendered;
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departure from the Guidelines range but does not authorize the court to
depart below a statutory mandatory minimum. 40 In order to depart from a
mandatory minimum sentence, the government must move pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e), which states, in pertinent part, "Upon motion of the
Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below
a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense." 41
1. Substantial Assistance Departures
The government motion requirement for sentencing departures invests
broad discretion in the prosecutor and represents a substantial shift in
sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. 42 While authorizing a
district court to depart downward from a guideline range or mandatory
minimum sentence, the Sentencing Commission did not define substantial
assistance or provide for any review of the prosecutor's decision.43 The
value of a substantial assistance motion to a defendant becomes
increasingly apparent when viewed in light of the Sentencing Guidelines'
narrow range of sentences and against the backdrop of Congress's statutory
directions to the Sentencing Commission.44
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id.
40. See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 124-26 (1996) (noting that a
prosecutor is entitled to make separate decisions about whether a defendant's cooperation
entitles him to a departure below the Guidelines minimum and the statutory minimum);
United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that while 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) (2000) forecloses a departure from a mandatory minimum absent a government
motion, the court could still consider substantial assistance as a mitigating factor in departing
from a Guidelines sentence).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) ("Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the
guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
994 of title 28, United States Code.").
42. See United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 787-89 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing the
impact of the Sentencing Guidelines on defendant cooperation and noting that "[u]nder the
Guidelines this sentencing power-of such great moment to a cooperating witness-was
transferred from the sentencing court to the prosecutor"); see also Proposal on 5K]. 1, supra
note 26, at 1506 (noting in addition that the requirement of government motion was inserted
unilaterally by the Sentencing Commission); Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 925-27
(explaining that the Sentencing Guidelines substantially increased the importance of
defendant cooperation).
43. See Proposal on 5K1.1, supra note 26, at 1507.
44. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 925-26; see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 25,
at 52-53 (discussing Congress's intent to discourage individualized sentences and encourage
sentencing severity through specific statutory directions). Because the Guidelines defined
sentences with such particularity and severely limited the factors that a judge could consider
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Today, substantial assistance departures constitute more than twenty
percent of all Guideline sentence departures. 45 A departing judge must
state his or her reasons for departing on the record and either the
government or the defendant may appeal any time the judge departs from an
applicable Guideline range. 46 Due to the government's interests in uniform
sentencing, the government regularly appeals sentences that are below the
Guideline range unless they have been granted pursuant to section 5K1 .1.
In 1998, the U.S. Sentencing Commission Substantial Assistance Staff
Working Group (Working Group) published a study addressing some of the
concerns about unequal application of the substantial assistance motion.47
The Working Group's paper noted that the Sentencing Commission's
instructions regarding the section 5Kl.1 substantial assistance policy
statement were purposefully vague.48 The paper identified four issues that
were raised but unanswered by the Guidelines policy statement: (1) the
statement did not address the factors to be used by a prosecutor when
determining whether substantial assistance was provided; (2) the statement
did not address problems with the government triggering mechanism for
substantial assistance; (3) the statement did not address issues as to whether
a defendant's information about himself qualifies as substantial assistance;
and (4) the policy statement's failure to specify how the magnitude of
cooperation would affect the extent of the departure. 49
While the Working Group ultimately concluded that more research was
required, the initial results of the study indicated that there was indeed an
equity problem in the application of substantial assistance. 50 The Working
Group was unable to locate "direct correlations between type of cooperation
when mitigating a defendant's sentence, substantial assistance became the only probable
means to secure a downward departure.
45. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Annual Report 36 (2006) ("Of all cases sentenced in
2006, 24.6 percent were sentenced below the guideline range based upon a reason sponsored
by the government. Most of these cases (14.4%) were sentenced pursuant to a motion...
[for] substantial assistance ...."); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to
Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial
Assistance Departures, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 199, 205 n.24 (1997) (documenting the increase
in substantial assistance departures from 1988 to 1995).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (2000). However, it is understood that grants of
substantial assistance based on a government motion are rarely appealed.
47. See Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy
and Practice (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf.
48. See id. at 3 ("The nature, extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad
spectrum of conduct that must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis. Latitude is,
therefore, afforded the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based on variable relevant
factors, including those listed above." (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1
cmt. background (2004))).
49. Id. at 3-4. This Note is primarily concerned with the problems inherent in the first
two factors.
50. Id. at 20. For a discussion of the merits of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Substantial Assistance Staff Working Group's findings in the face of the challenge of
evaluating substantial assistance across federal districts, see generally Daniel C. Richman,
The Challenges of Investigating Section 5K].] in Practice, 11 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 75 (1998).
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provided, type of benefit or result received by the government, the making
of a §5Kl.1 motion, and the extent of the substantial assistance departure
received."' 51 Of note were the Working Group's findings that "assistance to
authorities was a common occurrence, independent of whether a substantial
assistance departure was actually received. '52 Additionally, the Working
Group's paper indicated that not only did federal districts regularly diverge
from their own stated substantial assistance policies, but also that
substantial assistance was not being applied equally across federal
districts. 53 This finding suggests that there is no standard for what activity
merits a substantial assistance departure. 54
Another finding of the Working Group indicated that although
prosecutors are required to record their reasons forgranting or withholding
substantial assistance, there is no public access to that information. 55 This
finding corresponds with the public sentiment that prosecutors exercise too
much discretion under the sentencing guidelines. 56  Interestingly, the
Working Group was unable to identify statistical evidence that supported
the suggestion that a criminal's relative position in a criminal organization
increased his chances of receiving a substantial assistance departure. 57
Finally, the Working Group raised the question of whether the Sentencing
Commission needed to provide more guidance regarding the application of
section 5K1.1.58 The paper concluded that "[t]he philosophical debate that
addresses the assumptions and ramifications of the absolute versus
proportional approach is long overdue. '59
2. Unsuccessful Legal Challenges to Section 5K1 .1
A brief understanding of the legal challenges that have been brought
against section 5Kl.1 will be helpful in understanding the development of
the most recent separation of powers argument. 60 There have been three
51. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 47, at 20.
52. Id. at 9 (noting that while 67.5% of defendants provided assistance, only 38.6%
received a substantial assistance departure).
53. See id. at 8-9 (noting that "at a minimum, 15.8 percent [of reporting districts] may
have completely disregarded their review policies"); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Annual Report Sourcebook tbls.N-N-11 (indicating that nationally 14.4% of defendants
received a downward departure for substantial assistance, but that the percentage of
departures varied significantly between circuits).
54. Id. at 10 (indicating, however, that future research would be required).
55. See id. at 20.
56. Id. at 14 (pointing out that in a recent survey, "86 percent of respondents agreed (of
this, 57% said 'strongly agree') that 'sentencing guidelines give too much discretion to
prosecutors"'). "Further, 74.9 percent of federal judges... thought that the prosecutor had
'the greatest influence on the final guideline sentence."' Id. at 15.
57. See id. at 12.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id.
60. For the purposes of this Note and application in the courts, the legal analysis of
section 5K1.1 is analogous to that of § 3553(e). The only difference is that § 3553(e)
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distinct legal challenges to section 5KI.1.61 First, it has been argued that
the statute was an impermissible delegation of judicial responsibility to the
executive branch. 62 Some courts determined that sentencing was not an
entirely judicial function. 63 As will be discussed below, however, these
cases did not address whether combining all of the power to charge and
sentence in the executive branch would violate the separation of powers.
Commentators have also argued that the government motion requirement
violates the Due Process Clause. 64 However, in Wade v. United States, 65
the Supreme Court held that federal district courts have the authority to
review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion only if
the prosecutor's restraint was based on unconstitutional motives. 66 In
Wade, Harold Ray Wade, Jr., appealed his conviction on drug possession
and weapons charges. 67  Wade later provided information to law
enforcement officials that led to the arrest of another drug dealer.68 At his
sentencing hearing, Wade's counsel urged the court to sentence below the
ten-year mandatory minimum in order to reward Wade for his assistance to
the government.69 The lower court determined that it could not grant the
reduced sentence because the prosecutor had not moved, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e), for a downward departure.70
In Wade, the defendant did not argue that the government motion
requirement was unconstitutional, 71 but argued instead that a prosecutor's
authorizes a departure below the statutory minimum, while section 5KI.1 only authorizes
departure below the recommended Guidelines sentence.
61. For an excellent and more in-depth discussion of the various legal challenges
brought against section 5K1.1, see Proposal on 5K].1, supra note 26, at 1507-12.
62. See, e.g, United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1989) (summarizing
the above argument and also holding that exercise of this power does not amount to
"adjudication" because the ultimate power to decide the motion and pronounce the sentence
remains with the court); see also Proposal on 5K1.1, supra note 26, at 1508. Huerta can be
distinguished from the current argument because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held only that sentencing was a shared function between the branches, and Congress
had the power to create mandatory minimums. 878 F.2d at 91, 93.
63. Huerta, 878 F.2d at 91-92; see also United States v. Spillman, 924 F.2d 721, 724-25
(7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the assertion that section 5K1. 1 vests excessive power over the
defendant's sentence with the prosecutor is unpersuasive based on the traditional charging
power of the executive branch). The connection between charging power and the power to
sentence seems tenuous.
64. See Proposal on 5K].], supra note 26, at 1508; Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Prosecutorial
Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
Rev. 105, 131-32 (1994) (discussing the due process challenges raised in the district courts).
65. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
66. Id. at 185-86 (concluding that it is well within a prosecutor's discretion to decide
whether to file a section 5K 1.1 motion and concluding that only a refusal to grant the motion
based on unconstitutional motives is reviewable by the court).
67. Id. at 183-84.
68. Id. at 183.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 185 (conceding as a matter of statutory interpretation that § 3553(e) imposes a
government motion requirement). The Court found this position consistent with its
interpretation "that in both § 3553(e) and § 5Ki.1 the condition limiting the court's authority
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discretion in exercising the power to depart was subject to constitutional
limitations.72 The Court determined that there was no reason to treat a
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion any differently
than a prosecutor's other decisions. 73 Accordingly, the Court held that a
federal district court had the authority to review a prosecutor's failure to
grant a substantial assistance motion only if the refusal was based on an
unconstitutional motive. 74
Finally, it has been argued that section 5Kl.1 violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 75 However, courts have concluded that application of
section 5KI.1 does not discriminate on the basis of any suspect class, such
as race, and so is only subject to rational basis review.76
3. The Prosecutor's Role in Substantial Assistance
To better understand the implications of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a brief
explanation of the scope of prosecutorial discretion is necessary.
Historically, courts have been extremely deferential to the prosecutor's
decision not to charge a suspect. 77 While a prosecutor is precluded from
selecting people for prosecution based on race, sex, or other
unconstitutional factors, the test for showing discrimination requires
evidence of the government's intent to discriminate as well as a strong
showing that others similarly situated were treated differently. 78
Furthermore, prosecutors are free to charge a criminal with a lesser crime
even if they suspect the criminal of engaging in more significant criminal
gives the Government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has
substantially assisted." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. In essence, the Court reasoned that the evaluation of substantial assistance was
merely an extension of the executive's protected charging power. However, this assumption
is troubling because it ignores the fact that substantial assistance motions are made long after
the prosecutor has been deeply involved in the defendant's trial.
74. Id. at 185-86 (noting "that a claim that a defendant merely provided substantial
assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy").
75. See Proposal on 5K].1, supra note 26, at 1509; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking
Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 212 (1993) (discussing how the
disparity between the extent of criminal knowledge among criminals places the highly
culpable criminal in a better position to receive a substantial assistance departure and
provides a special guarantee to a more culpable defendant).
76. See United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1486-87 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the
above argument and applying a highly deferential standard of review because criminals are
not a suspect class). Although all of these arguments have been rejected by courts, the
number of challenges indicates the controversy surrounding the application of section 5K1.1.
It is also important to note that none of these challenges addresses whether it is permissible
to place all the sentencing power with the executive branch.
77. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that, even in the face of statutory language that seems to require prosecution, the
court has never considered the decision to charge to be outside prosecutorial discretion).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that, given the
defendant's failure to provide evidence that others similarly situated were not prosecuted, the
Court did not find selective prosecution).
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activity. 79 In United States v. Batchelder, the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor was not required to charge the defendant with the more lenient
crime when a defendant's conduct violated two statutes with different
punishments.8 0 Finally, in Wade v. United States, the Court determined that
a prosecutor's substantial assistance decision was protected by prosecutorial
discretion and held that a defendant's claim that he had provided substantial
assistance did not entitle him to judicial review of the prosecution's
decision.8' Based on the Court's historical deference to prosecutorial
discretion, it seems clear that the prosecutor wields almost complete control
over whether a defendant's sentence should be reduced for substantial
assistance.8
2
4. United States v. Booker
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, which
invalidated the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines.8 3 In
79. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that the plain
language of the statute allowed the government to prosecute for a lesser crime in the absence
of proof of the more serious crime). Similarly, prosecutors are not bound to charge a suspect
at the earliest possible time and are free to indict at their discretion. See, e.g., United States
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977) (giving significant weight to the government's
decision on how to allocate law enforcement resources and noting that "[tihe decision to file
criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide
range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government's case, in order to determine
whether prosecution would be in the public interest").
80. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (noting again the Court's deference
to the prosecutor's charging decision). For a discussion of the potential implications of this
extensive prosecutorial power in narcotics cases, see Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the
Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective
and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 87 (2003), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 325-28.
81. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 184-87 (1992). For a more detailed discussion
of Wade, see supra Part I.A.2.
82. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 927 ("[T]he sentencing guidelines vest the
prosecutor with complete discretion as to whether the government will seek a downward
departure based upon the defendant's substantial assistance."). While this Note in no way
seeks to suggest that prosecutors should not wield the power to charge and investigate, the
point is that prosecutors do control these aspects of the criminal process-specifically
investigating and charging-from day one. This Note also accepts that people certainly act
of their own free will and, for the most part, choose to engage in criminal conduct.
However, as Professor Weinstein points out, the government's near complete control over
charging and sentencing does enable them to orchestrate criminal activity, especially in drug
cases, in a way that highlights the true amount of power afforded to prosecutors. See
Weinstein, supra note 80, discussed infra text accompanying note 326. But cf Bruce A.
Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 381,
449 (2002) (suggesting that prosecutors' desire to serve the public might translate into a
desire to serve justice and noting that "[i]mplicit in any deference to prosecutorial
decisionmaking is the notion that, at least sometimes, we can trust prosecutors to behave
ethically").
83. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In the years before Booker, judges
were bound to sentence a defendant within the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range.
Booker determined that the Sentencing Guidelines should be considered one of many factors
in determining a defendant's sentence.
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Booker, the district judge found additional facts at the sentencing hearing
and, based on a preponderance of the evidence, imposed a longer sentence
than the Guidelines required as a result of the new information. 84 On
appeal, the court rejected the government's recommendation that the
proposed Guidelines sentence was proper based on the additional facts,
finding instead that under mandatory Guidelines any facts that increased a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury. 85 In the first part of the Booker opinion, written by Justice John Paul
Stevens, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's findings and
determined that any fact necessary to support a sentence that exceeds the
statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.86
In the second part of the opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer held that in order
to allow the Guidelines to coexist with the Sixth Amendment, it was
necessary to excise the two statutory provisions that made application of the
Guidelines mandatory. 87 The Court determined that, while judges were not
bound by the Guidelines, they must consult the relevant Guidelines factors
when imposing a sentence. 88 Finally, the Booker Court granted appellate
review of sentencing under a reasonableness standard, finding that such a
standard was consistent with Congress's intentions. 89
B. Separation of Powers Analysis in the U.S. Supreme Court
The framers of the Constitution deliberately divided power between the
legislative, judicial, and executive branches.90 They recognized the need
84. Id. at 227 (discussing how after the jury found Freddie Booker guilty of intent to
distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, the judge determined at a separate hearing
that Booker was also in possession of 566 grams of crack and was guilty of obstructing
justice).
85. Id. at 227-28 (relying on the Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000)).
86. Id. at 244.
87. See id. at 259 (determining that removal of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004)
(courts shall impose a Guidelines sentence) and § 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (standards
of review on appeal) from the Act would satisfy constitutional requirements). The Court did
not revisit whether application of the Guidelines presented separation of powers issues.
88. See id. at 245-46.
89. Id. at 261-62. Subsequently, in Rita, the Supreme Court determined that appellate
courts could apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence within the
Sentencing Guidelines. While indicating that the presumption was non-binding, Justice
Stephen Breyer noted that the permissible presumption "reflects the fact that, by the time an
appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing
judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the
proper sentence in the particular case." See id. The final question that remains unanswered
by the Supreme Court is whether the government can argue on appeal that a non-Guidelines
sentence is presumptively unreasonable. The Supreme Court, in Gall v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 2933 (2007) (mem.), will hear this argument in the coming Term. If this is indeed
held to be the case, then the overall effect, despite Justice Breyer's language in Rita, would
seem to be to return the Sentencing Guidelines to near mandatory status.
90. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). For an in-depth discussion
of the history and development of separation of powers in U.S. government, see Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1755-1807 (1996).
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for checks and balances in order to protect this power structure.9t
Accordingly, the framers provided each branch with the "necessary
constitutional means ... to resist [the] encroachments of the others. ' 92 The
judicial branch's ability to decide constitutional issues has allowed it to
enforce the separation of powers doctrine against the intrusions of the
legislative branch. 9 3 In order to dampen the "hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its
power," even measures passed to "accomplish desirable objectives[] must
be resisted."'94 To that end, laws are stricken "where the whole power of
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department. '95
By intentionally dividing the power of the government into three separate
branches, the framers hoped to avoid tyranny at the hands of the
government. 96 James Madison wrote, "In order to lay a due foundation for
that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government...
[that is] essential to the preservation of liberty... each department should
have a will of its own."' 97 Therefore, the framers created each branch of
government with the "necessary constitutional means ... to resist [the]
encroachments of the others." 98
While not explicit in the Constitution, the importance of separation of
powers can be derived from the Constitution's clear statement that (1) "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States"; (2) "The executive Power shall be vested in [the] President
of the United States of America"; and (3) "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 99
91. See The Federalist No. 51, at 267-68 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
92. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)); see also Flaherty, supra note 90, at 1802 (noting that "the
Federalists defended the Constitution's at times quirky division of powers as the surest way
to achieve the elusive goal of balance").
93. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-21 (1995) (explaining that the
framers were particularly concerned with "legislative interference with the private-law
judgments of the courts").
94. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
95. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison),
supra note 92, at 325-26 (emphasis omitted)).
96. The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 91, at 249-50 (discussing the
need to keep the branches of the government separate in order to avoid tyranny).
97. See The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 91, at 268. Madison
believed that it was important to guard against the gradual concentration of powers in the
same department. Id.
98. Id. (noting that "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition"). However, while
discussing separation of powers, Madison does not offer any scheme for how courts can
protect themselves. It is possible that Madison believed that the problem would take care of
itself.
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1. As evidenced by the Federalist
debates, to what degree these powers should be separated is what drives most modem
discussions. See Flaherty, supra note 90, at 1803 ("Where the Federalists and Anti-
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Traditionally, scholars have categorized Supreme Court separation of
powers cases based on whether the Justices employed a functionalist or
formalist methodology to decide the case. 100 The formalist approach to
separation of powers is characterized by the use of bright-line rules,
executed rigidly to invalidate any system that does not keep each branch
within its prescribed sphere of power. 10' The formalist methodology
requires the Court to characterize what kind of power is being exercised,
and then to determine whether that power is within the proper branch in
accordance with any constitutional requirements. 102 In the following cases,
the majority opinions utilize first formalist and then functionalist reasoning
to reach their holdings. However, it is the strong dissenting opinions of
Justice Byron White (championing functionalism) and then of Justice
Antonin Scalia (championing formalism) that have galvanized the present
understanding of these fundamental arguments about separation of powers
analysis.
1. Formalism and Functionalism: The Stability of Division and the Need
to Accommodate Change
a. INS v. Chadha
In INS v. Chadha, Chief Justice Warren Burger employed a formalist
analysis to invalidate a law that permitted one house of Congress to veto an
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decision that would allow a
deportable alien to remain in the United States.' 0 3 The Chief Justice wrote,
"Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and
Federalists parted company was on the question of whether the Constitution's approach to
the doctrine [of separation of powers] struck the proper balance."). It was later held that
prosecutors would be considered part of the executive. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988). Although Article III does not state explicitly what judicial power includes,
the Supreme Court has recognized that there are powers that are inherently judicial. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-21 (1976); see also Jessica S. Intermill & William E.
Martin, Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Feeney Amendment: The Constitutional
Case for Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 27 Hamline L. Rev. 391, 414 (2004) ("The core
function of courts is the exercise of discretion to decide individual cases fairly.., within the
bounds of generalized rules.").
100. For a description of the terms formalism and functionalism as they are used in the
context of Supreme Court separation of powers analysis, see generally Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987); see also Flaherty, supra note 90, at 1734
n.34 (drawing a distinction between Strauss's "functionalism"--referring to the functions of
the government-and Professor Flaherty's own "functionalism"-referring to the actual
balance and functions of the government). This Note uses the latter meaning of
functionalism.
101. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). It is the security of bright-line
rules that initially turns most law students into cheerleaders of the formalist approach.
102. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-17 (1926).
103. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. In his concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell agreed with the
formalist analysis but reached his decision based on what he perceived as Congress
exercising unchecked judicial power. Id. at 963 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
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define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the
legislative process."' 0 4 He believed that Article I of the Constitution
represented the framers' decision that legislative power was part of a
"single, finely wraught and exhaustively considered, procedure."' 10 5 While
noting that the powers of the three branches were not to be "hermetically"
sealed from one another, the Chief Justice asserted that the delegated
powers of the three branches are "functionally identifiable."',0 6
The Chief Justice then identified four explicit provisions in the
Constitution by which one house of Congress could act alone and not be
subject to the President's veto: (1) the House alone could initiate
impeachment; (2) the Senate alone could conduct trials following
impeachment; (3) the Senate has final and unreviewable power to approve
presidential appointments; and (4) the Senate has unreviewable power to
ratify presidential treaties. 10 7 Based on the presence of these explicit and
narrow provisions, each specifically justified, the Chief Justice concluded
that the constitutional design of the legislative branch did not permit the
veto. 108
In his dissent, Justice Byron White asserted his now famous modem
formulation of the proper functionalist analysis for separation of powers.
Noting that the legislative veto had become the primary means for Congress
to secure the accountability of independent agencies and the executive,
Justice White argued that without the security of the veto, Congress would
either be forced to refrain from delegating authority and become entrenched
in the "hopeless task of writing laws ... across the entire policy landscape,
or in the alternative, [would] abdicate its lawmaking function to the
Executive Branch and independent agencies." 10 9 Justice White indicated
that the legislative veto was appropriate because Congress had not used it to
aggrandize power to itself at the expense of the other branches, but instead
as a needed defense to guarantee Congress's ultimate law-making
authority.1 0 Further, Justice White noted that the executive frequently
agreed to legislative review in exchange for broader delegation authority. 11
When addressing Chief Justice Burger's assertion that the legislative veto
was invalid because it was not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution,
Justice White argued that the absence was not surprising and should not be
read to imply disapproval of the specific mechanism because the framers
104. Id. at 945.
105. Id. at 951. This language suggests that in the formalist analysis, there is no room for
novel inventions to deal with the realities of running the government.
106. See id. at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 121 (1976)).
107. See id. at 955.
108. Id. at 956.
109. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 974.
111. Id.
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recognized that the government of the United States was an endeavor "far
beyond.., contemplation.""12
Justice White was determined to dissect the alleged threat posed by the
legislative veto. He asserted that the legislative veto did not equal the
power to write new laws absent presidential or bicameral approval.' 13
Because the veto required statutory authorization and could only negate
executive or independent agency proposals, Justice White argued that,
analogous to the notion that the presidential veto did not allow the president
to make laws, the legislative veto did not allow one house of Congress to
make laws. 114
Justice White urged that the separation of powers included a history of
"accommodation and practicality" focused on the effective working of the
government as a whole.' 15 Accordingly, the proper inquiry for determining
whether a government act violates separation of powers should "focus[] on
the extent to which [Congress's legislation] prevents the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 1 6 According
to Justice White, the legislative veto survived that inquiry because it did not
preclude the executive from performing its constitutionally assigned
function. 117
b. Bowsher v. Synar
In Bowsher v. Synar,118 the Supreme Court declared that the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violated the doctrine of
separation of powers because Congress reserved to itself the power of
removal of the comptroller general, an officer of the executive branch. 119
The Court held,
By placing the responsibility for execution of the... Act in the hands of
an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has
retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the
executive function. The Constitution does not permit such intrusion. 120
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, reiterating that
"[t]he declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of
112. Id. at 978 ("[Tlhe wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation would
grow and new problems of governance would require different solutions.").
113. See id. at 980.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 999 (noting that the Constitution did not contemplate complete separation
of the three branches of government, and further reiterating that the Court's holding ignores
the fact that in our modem government powers are often delegated).
116. Id. at 1000 (citing Nixon v. Adm'r ofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
117. See id. However, Justice Byron White conceded that a hypothetical legislative check
on an inherently executive function would pose a different question. Id. at 1002.
118. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
119. Id. at 726.
120. Id. at 734.
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government . . . was to 'diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.""'12 1
The Chief Justice noted that "[e]ven a cursory examination of the
Constitution reveals ... that checks and balances were the foundation of a
structure of government that would protect liberty."' 122 Finally, Burger
concluded that, while the system of separation of powers produces conflicts
at times, "it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open
debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for
the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power."' 23 When
addressing Justice White's dissent, the Chief Justice argued that separation
of powers arguments cannot be permitted to turn on judicial assessment of
the practical results of the provision. 124
In his dissent, Justice White refined his argument for a functionalist
approach, asserting that "formalistic and unbending rules in the area of
separation of powers may unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed
and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers."' 25 He argued that
the majority holding ignored the twin aims of the Constitution to both
secure liberty by diffusing power and to create a workable government by
integrating those powers. 126  Justice White emphasized that the focus
should not be on establishing bright-line rules but instead on whether the
potential disruption of power is justified by a valid congressional objective
within its constitutional authority. 127 Accordingly, Congress's delegation
of power to an officer independent from the President did not deprive the
President of any executive power to which he was otherwise entitled, nor
did it hinder the duties of his office. 12 8 To illustrate this point, Justice
White proposed that if Congress's budget-cutting mechanism had required
the responsible officer to exercise a significant amount of policy discretion,
Congress may have been required to place such an officer within the power
of the executive. Instead, Congress "created a precise and articulated set of
criteria designed to minimize the degree of policy choice exercised by the
officer," which did not deprive the President of any rightful authority. 29
Justice White proceeded to question whether, realistically, the threat of
removal of the comptroller general through a joint resolution that also
required the signature of the President rendered the comptroller subservient
to Congress. 130  If so, did placing this "executive" power with the
121. Id. at 721 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
122. Id. at 722.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 730.
125. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Id. at 721 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
127. Id. at 762-63 (noting that while the inquiry would not be easy, the Court should
focus on the extent to which the limitation prevents the executive from accomplishing its
constitutional functions).
128. Id. at 723.
129. Id. at 764.
130. Id. at 769.
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comptroller really amount to unlawful retention of executive power by
Congress? Justice White believed that the removal provision posed no
"genuine threat of 'encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.""' 13 1 Furthermore, Justice White argued, the practical
effect of the removal provision rendered the comptroller even more
independent. 132 He concluded by suggesting that the Court should limit its
search to asking whether the present balance of authority among the
branches "pose[s] a genuine threat to the basic division between the
lawmaking power and the power to execute the law."'1 33
2. Functionalism Returns in Criminal Law Cases
While the previous two cases illustrate instances where the Supreme
Court utilized a formalist analysis, other recent separation of powers cases
have also applied Justice White's functionalist methodology. 34  The
functionalist approach represents adaptation and flexibility. 35  A
functionalist inquiry should ask whether, under a given statutory scheme,
"one branch [of government] assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."' 136 Additionally, the functional analysis should
consider whether the statutory scheme "prevents [the impaired branch] from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."' 137 If so, the court
should inquire whether "an overriding need to promote objectives within
the constitutional authority of Congress" justifies the impairment. 138 This
functionalist analysis permits a blending of power among the branches so
long as one branch does not aggrandize its power at the expense of another
or inappropriately encroach on the central functions of another. 139 It has
been argued that functionalism provides the most potential for
accommodating needed changes to the current system of government and
criminal justice. 14 0
131. Id. at 770 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,122 (1976)).
132. Id. at 773.
133. Id. at 776 (noting that he saw no such threat).
134. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(finding that there was no aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a
coordinate branch); see also Flaherty, supra note 90, at 1737-38 (discussing the Supreme
Court cases utilizing a functionalist methodology).
135. See Strauss, supra note 100, at 513.
136. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952)).
137. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
140. Cf Strauss, supra note 100, at 512 (noting that while both formalism and
functionalism have positive attributes, making a resolution unlikely, the flexibility of
functionalism may offer a better solution for the unique challenges facing modem
government).
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a. Morrison v. Olson
In Morrison v. Olson, 14 1 the Court examined whether the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 authorizing the appointment of an independent
counsel to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct by high-ranking
government officials violated the separation of powers doctrine. 142 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The Chief
Justice noted that the Court has "never held that the Constitution requires
that the three branches of government 'operate with absolute
independence.' 143 Rehnquist observed that the case did not involve an
attempt by Congress to usurp power from the executive branch. 144 The
Court relaxed its approach to separation of powers, rejecting the more rigid
formalist approach in favor of a balancing test that asked "whether
[Congress's] removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty .... ,,145 Chief Justice
Rehnquist determined that the President's desire to "control the exercise
of... [the independent counsel's] discretion" was not "so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch" so as to violate separation of
powers. 146 The Court concluded that the Ethics in Government Act did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine because it did not impermissibly
interfere with the functions of the executive branch.147
Justice Antonin Scalia strongly dissented on both formalist and
functionalist grounds, 148 noting that "[i]t is the proud boast of our
democracy that we have 'a government of laws and not of men."' 49 Using
a formalist analysis, Justice Scalia argued that Article II of the Constitution
should be read as vesting "all of the executive power" in the President. 150
He asserted that because criminal prosecution was a purely executive power
and the statute at issue deprived the President of exclusive control of that
power, the statute violated separation of powers. 15' Justice Scalia
maintained that investigating and prosecuting crimes constituted a purely
executive power, and to remove that power was to take away a core
141. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
142. Id. at 693.
143. Id. at 693-94 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707).
144. Id. at 694.
145. Id. at 691.
146. Id. at 691-92 (noting "that the 'good cause' removal provision [does not]
impermissibly burden[] the President's power to control or supervise the independent
counsel").
147. Id. at 696-97.
148. See id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 697. Justice Antonin Scalia traced the quote from the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitution, that states, "The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers.., to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men." Id. (Mass. Const.
of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX).
150. Id. at 705.
151. Id.
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function. 152  According to Justice Scalia, the question of how much the
statute reduced presidential control was irrelevant.15 3 As long as any power
is removed from the executive, there is a separation of powers violation.154
Justice Scalia rejected the Court's use of a balancing test to determine
whether the transferred executive function was "so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require complete control."'1 5 5 He
argued that it was improper for the Court to determine how much purely
executive power should remain fully within the President's control to avoid
a violation, noting that "[t]he Constitution prescribes that they all are." 156
Therefore, although strict separated powers may prevent the Court from
remedying every wrong, this small cost is necessary to protect liberty. 57
Justice Scalia then proceeded to apply his own balancing test to show
that, even under the Court's misguided judgment, the Ethics in Government
Act was still invalid. He argued that while the boldness of the President
may not be hindered by the threat of congressional investigation, the
President's high-level assistants who lack the support of a political base
may be intimidated by the prospect of investigation. According to Justice
Scalia, this would weaken the President by "reducing the zeal of his
staff."1 58 Furthermore, Justice Scalia expressed concern that, in times when
the President was at odds with Congress, a public investigation might be
used as a political tool to erode his public support.' 59 Even under the
balancing test, Justice Scalia argued that the Ethics in Government Act
substantially deprived the President of prosecutorial control in a way that
substantially affected the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches. 160  Justice Scalia concluded by pronouncing, "A
152. Id. (advancing his theory of the unitary executive, and noting that the language of
Article II "does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power").
153. See id. at 708. Addressing the question of how to monitor the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion under the unitary executive, Justice Scalia asserted, "Under our
system of government, the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one. The
prosecutors who exercise this awesome discretion are selected and can be removed by a
President, whom the people have trusted enough to elect." Id. at 728. According to Justice
Scalia, if prosecutors fail to prosecute fairly and regularly abuse their discretion, "the
President pays the cost in political damage to his administration." Id. at 729.
154. Id. ("The case is over when the Court acknowledges, as it must, that [iut is
undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control ... the President exercises over the
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity." (first alteration
in original) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
155. Id. at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court has, nonetheless, replaced
the clear constitutional prescription that the executive power belongs to the President with a
'balancing test.' Id. at 711.
156. Id. at 709.
157. Id. at 710-11.
158. Id. at 713.
159. See id. ("Nothing is so politically effective as the ability to charge that one's
opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive, ineffective, but, in all
probability, 'crooks."').
160. Id at 714-15. Justice Scalia then went on to address the majority's distinction
between principal and inferior officers.
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government of laws means a government of rules." 161 Because the Court's
decision fragmenting executive power was not governed by rules, Justice
Scalia determined that it was "ungoverned by law."' 162
b. Mistretta v. United States
In Mistretta v. United States,163 the Court addressed the question of
whether Congress could delegate the authority to create sentencing laws to
an independent commission housed in the judicial branch and staffed by
federal judges. 164 The Court held that, because "sentencing has been and
remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of
rulemaking... remains appropriate to that Branch," Congress's carefully
considered delegation of this power to an independent commission located
in the judicial branch did not violate separation of powers doctrines. 165
Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun noted that the
Constitution has never been thought to exclusively assign federal
sentencing to any one of the three branches of government.166 In stating the
Court's "intelligible principle" test for determining the permissibility of
Congress obtaining assistance from other branches, he noted that the
Court's delegation jurisprudence "has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."' 167
In analyzing Congress's delegation of authority to the Sentencing
Commission, the Court first determined that although Congress's delegation
was broad, the instructions were "sufficiently specific and detailed to meet
constitutional requirements."'' 68 Next, the Court examined the claim that
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 violated the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Justice Blackmun began his discussion by
reaffirming the framers' judgment that separating governmental powers into
three branches was "essential to the preservation of liberty."'169 He noted,
however, that the framers rejected the idea that the three branches must be
161. Id. at 733.
162. Id.
163. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
164. The actual relationship of the Sentencing Commission to the judiciary is debatable.
While the agency has judges as members, it is not under the control of a judicial body and
does not decide controversies. See id. at 384-85.
165. Id. at 396-97.
166. Id. at 364.
167. Id. at 372.
168. Id. at 374. The Court determined that Congress had provided not only specific goals
to the Sentencing Commission but had also included detailed instructions for determining
sentencing parameters. While the Court conceded that the Commission exercised significant
discretion in formulating guidelines, the Court concluded that delegations that included a
need to exercise judgments on matters of policy were acceptable. See id. at 374-79.
169. Id. at 380 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988)).
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entirely separate and distinct. 170 Quoting James Madison's Federalist No.
47, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that separation of powers does not
mean that the three branches cannot share power.171 Instead, constitutional
problems arise only when all the power of one branch is exercised by the
same branch that possesses all the power of another branch. 172 Justice
Blackmun noted that "[i]n adopting this flexible understanding of
separation of powers.., the greatest security against tyranny... lies not in
a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of
checked and balanced power within each Branch."1 73 Justice Blackmun
emphasized, however, that the Court was willing to invalidate provisions of
law that placed too much power in a single branch.' 74
In cases focusing on the judicial branch, the Court identified two specific
dangers: (1) that the judicial branch cannot be assigned tasks that are more
appropriately performed by another branch, and (2) that provisions of law
must maintain the integrity of the judicial branch. 175 The Court again noted
that it would only invalidate a statutory provision that had been approved
by both houses of Congress and the President for "'the most compelling
constitutional reasons."" 76
In his defense, Mistretta argued that the creation of the Sentencing
Commission placed too much power within the judicial branch and
undermined the judiciary's independence and integrity. 177  The Court
acknowledged that the express provisions of Article III limit judicial power
to "Cases" and "Controversies."' 178  Nonetheless, the Court has long
recognized significant exceptions to this general rule and has allowed the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 380-81 (quoting The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 92, at
325-26).
172. Id. at 381 ("'[T]hat where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted."' (quoting The Federalist No. 47 (James
Madison), supra note 92, at 325-26)). This is consistent with a functionalist approach to
separation of powers issues.
173. Id. "[T]he great[est] security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means ... to resist encroachments of the others." The Federalist No.
51 (James Madison), supra note 91, at 268.
174. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382-83 (1989) (discussing cases in which
the Court has invalidated attempts by Congress to exercise the power of other branches or
reassign powers vested by the Constitution in either the judicial or the executive branches).
175. Id. at 383; see also id. at 383 n.13 (adding that in cases where a potential disruption
is present, the Court will "determine 'whether [the] impact is justified by an overriding need
to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress' (quoting Nixon v.
Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977))).
176. Id. at 384 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
177. Id. at 383-84 (arguing that by placing the Sentencing Commission within the
Judicial Branch, Congress was allowing Article III judges to exercise both judicial and
legislative authority and subjecting those same judges to "political whims").
178. Id. at 385; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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assumption of "nonadjudicatory activities by the Judicial Branch."'1 79
Noting that "the sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared
responsibility among the Branches of Government,"' 80  the Court
determined that vesting rule-making decisions with the judicial branch was
consistent with the role that the judiciary "always has played, and continues
to play, in sentencing."' 181  Holding that there was no constitutional
violation, the Court emphasized that its separation of powers analysis
focused on the "practical consequences" of the government-delegating
scheme and not on the labeling of the activity.] 82
The Court, however, left open the possibility of whether a separation of
powers problem would arise if Congress assigned judicial responsibility to
the executive branch, noting, "[H]ad Congress decided to confer
responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive
Branch, we might face the constitutional questions whether Congress
unconstitutionally had assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or
unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute and the power to
sentence within one Branch."1 83
In his dissent, Justice Scalia again employed a formalist analysis to
object to the delegation of congressional law-making authority to an agency
created for the sole purpose of making laws.184 Justice Scalia argued that,
because the Sentencing Commission had no other responsibilities besides
making laws, the commission amounted to a "junior-varsity Congress" that
did not fit within the three branches of government identified by the
Constitution. 185 According to Justice Scalia, only the legislature should
make policy decisions concerning government. 186 Justice Scalia suggested
that what is really at issue "is whether there has been any delegation of
legislative power" and concluded that, "[s]trictly speaking, there is no
acceptable delegation of legislative power." 187  He reasoned that the
Sentencing Commission's law-making power was not ancillary to any
enforcement powers and therefore was unconstitutional.' 88 Justice Scalia
characterized the majority decision as "treat[ing] the Constitution as though
179. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386 (discussing the ...twilight area' in which the activities of
the separate Branches merge" and allow for a sharing of power between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches).
180. Id. at 390.
181. Id. at 391.
182. Id. at 393.
183. Id. at 391 n.17.
184. See id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that calling the Sentencing
Commission's findings "Guidelines" did not preclude them from having the effect of law).
185. Id. at 427. Justice Scalia reasoned that the Court accepted the delegation not because
Congress was permitted to assign its powers to another branch, but because it "inheres in
most executive or judicial action." Id. at 417.
186. See id. at 415.
187. Id. at 419. Justice Scalia, however, did not object to the creation of agencies where
governmental power was not at issue. See id. at 423.
188. See id. at420-21.
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it were no more than a generalized prescription that the functions of the
Branches should not be commingled too much."' 189
To the contrary, Justice Scalia reiterated that the Constitution was not a
suggestion but a prescribed structure and framework directing the conduct
of government. 190 He argued that the only acceptable commingling was
"specifically provided for in the [constitutional] structure [the framers] had
designed."' 19 1  Ultimately, Justice Scalia argued, absent specific
authorization in the Constitution, no commingling of power is
acceptable. 192
Part L.A of this Note presented a brief overview of U.S. sentencing
history and discussed the government motion requirement for a downward
departure for substantial assistance and the courts' deference to the
prosecutors' discretion in substantial assistance determinations. This part
also discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Booker v. United States,
which invalidated the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Part I.B of this Note discussed the two analytical frameworks-formalism
and functionalism-historically employed by the Supreme Court when
adjudicating separation of powers questions, and the strong dissenting
opinions that galvanized both frameworks. Part II of this Note discusses the
current state of the law in the circuit courts concerning the validity of the
government motion requirement for substantial assistance and academic
arguments supporting and rejecting the current approach to the government
motion requirement.
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND CONTESTING THE GOVERNMENT
MOTION REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
Part II.A presents circuit cases that hold that the government motion
requirement does not violate separation of powers doctrines, and also
presents legal arguments supporting the functional blending of powers in
the federal government and in the sentencing process. Part I.B of this Note
discusses circuit holdings that have criticized the reasoning in cases that
have held that the government motion requirement does not violate the
separation of powers. This part also presents the most recent legal
challenge to the government motion requirement-that placing all of the
power to charge and sentence in the executive violates separation of
powers. Finally, Part II.B discusses academic challenges both to the current
functionalist approach employed by the Supreme Court in separation of
189. Id. at 426.
190. See id. (noting that the framers considered exactly when and how much government
commingling was acceptable and provided for such specific instances in the Constitution).
191. Id. (discussing the presidential veto, the Senate's confirmation of executive and
judicial officers, ratification of treaties, and Congress's impeachment power as the four
specific provisions of the Constitution allowing for a commingling of power).
192. See id. at 427 ("[lun the long run the improvisation of a constitutional structure on
the basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous.").
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powers cases involving criminal law, and to the exercise of potentially
unchecked prosecutorial discretion.
A. The Government Triggering Mechanism of Section 5Ki.] Does Not
Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. United States v. Huerta
In United States v. Huerta, the defendant was sentenced pursuant to a
plea bargain to a mandatory minimum of five years under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II).1 93 At sentencing, defendant Robert Huerta moved for
a downward departure based on his cooperation, and the government argued
that Huerta's purported cooperation fell below the level of substantial
assistance. 194 The district court concluded that because § 3553(e) requires a
motion by the government as a prerequisite for a departure below the
statutory minimum, the court "lacked authority to impose a sentence below
such a minimum." 195
On appeal, Huerta argued that sentencing is a judicial prerogative that
"necessarily includes the power to consider all relevant factors." 196  He
argued that a congressional sentencing scheme that "delegates to the
prosecutorial arm of the Executive Branch the authority to control when a
judge may consider cooperation" as a mitigating factor in sentencing
"usurps a constitutionally assigned judicial function." 197
The Second Circuit began its analysis by reiterating that the Supreme
Court has never required the three branches of the government to operate
with complete independence.' 98 Instead, the Second Circuit explained,
courts have employed a "flexible understanding of separation of
powers."1 99 The court noted that statutes allowing some commingling of
the functions of the branches are acceptable as long as they posed no danger
of either aggrandizement or encroachment.200
The court determined that § 3553(e) does not permit government
"adjudication" and that the ultimate power to decide the motion and
pronounce the sentence remained with the court. 20 1 The court reasoned that
the authority granted to the executive under § 3553(e) was considerably less
193. United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1989).
194. Id. While it appears that Robert Huerta desired to offer assistance, the Drug
Enforcement Administration claimed that Huerta never revealed the identity of his drug
supplier. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988)).
199. Id. at 92 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989)).
200. Id. (stating that "[t]he statute in question clearly passes muster").
201. Id.; see also United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the "only authority 'delegated' ... is the authority to move the district court for a
reduction in sentence" (citation omitted)).
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than the acknowledged executive authority to decide whether to prosecute
and what charges to bring. 20 2 The Second Circuit held that § 3553(e) does
not prevent judges from executing their constitutional duties or usurp an
inherently judicial function. 20 3  The court employed a flexible
understanding of separation of powers and held that the judicial branch does
not possess exclusive sentencing authority.20
4
2. Other Circuits
There are a number of circuit cases that have followed the reasoning in
Huerta. The courts have reasoned that because Congress has the power to
legislate mandatory minimums, a prosecutor's use of substantial assistance
is within his or her discretion. In United States v. Rexach,205 defendant
Domingo Rexach was indicted for distributing three vials of cocaine near an
elementary school.206 He entered into a cooperation agreement with the
government that stated,
[I]f it is determined by this Office that Domingo Rexach has made a good
faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, this Office
will file a motion ... so that the sentencing judge shall have the authority
to impose a sentence below.., a minimum sentence, and... pursuant to
Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.20 7
Before sentencing, the government determined that Rexach had not made
a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance.20 8 Rexach moved for
specific performance or, in the alternative, recognition that the government
motion requirement violated both due process and the separation of powers
202. See Huerta, 878 F.2d at 92. Because the issue presented in this case was whether
Congress's enactment of the statute was an impermissible delegation of judicial authority,
the court did not consider whether combining the acknowledged exclusive authority to
prosecute with the power to determine sentence was a violation of separation of powers
doctrines. The Second Circuit went on to note that "[t]he authority to decide whether or not
to prosecute, and on what charges ... is ... far more intrusive on sentencing decisions than
the limited power afforded by Section 3553(e)." Id.
203. Id. at 93 (noting that sentencing is a shared function among the branches and not
inherently or exclusively judicial). Additionally, the court also indicated that Congress
could, if it desired, eliminate all discretion in sentencing judges by establishing mandatory
sentences. Id. Similarly, the court dispatched with Huerta's due process argument by noting
that "there is no right to individualized sentencing, and Congress may... constrain the
exercise ofjudicial discretion ... so long as such constraints have a rational basis." Id. at 94
(citations omitted).
204. Id. at 93. The court noted that prosecutors are "uniquely fit" to decide whether
substantial assistance has been given. Id.
205. 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1990).
206. Id. at711.
207. Id. at 712 (quoting United States v. Rexach, 713 F. Supp. 126, 127-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
208. Id.
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doctrine. 209 The court determined that the prosecutor had made a good
faith determination that Rexach had not provided substantial assistance.
2 10
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed whether cooperation agreements
limit a prosecutor's discretion and whether a prosecutor's decision not to
grant the departure is reviewable. 2 11 Citing its recent decision in Huerta,
the Second Circuit held that evaluation of a defendant's effort in providing
substantial assistance lies within the discretion of the prosecutor and may be
reviewed only on a showing of prosecutorial misconduct or bad faith.
212
In United States v. Snell,2 13 the defendant was charged with attempt to
possess and distribute one kilogram of cocaine. 2 14  After receiving
sentencing letters from both parties, the district court determined that 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) and section 5KI.1 were unconstitutional because each
provision violated the separation of powers doctrine. 2 15  Although the
government never filed a substantial assistance motion, the court held an
evidentiary hearing and determined that Laura Snell had made a good faith
effort to provide substantial assistance and sentenced her to only two years
in prison.2 16 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that the district court erred in holding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and section
5KI.I unconstitutional and vacated the sentence on the ground that the
lower court had departed without authorization from the government.
2 17
In United States v. Severich,2 18 defendant Victoria Severich was charged
with intent to distribute cocaine. She argued that the substantial assistance
provision in the Guidelines placed an inherently judicial function in the
executive in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 21 9 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected defendant's
analogy to Bowsher, noting, "Neither Bowsher nor any other cases relied
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 713.
212. Id. at 713-14. The court added, "[Wle see no significant danger arising from
prosecutors' possibly misusing cooperation agreements and shirking their promises to make
downward departure motions." Id. at 714 (noting that there are institutional incentives for the
prosecutor to act in good faith). Judge Lawrence Pierce dissented based on the application
of contract principles in the case. Id. at 715 (Pierce, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that,
because Rexach supplied information that later led to three arrests, "[his] assistance
constitutes 'substantial assistance' within the meaning of the subject plea agreement").
213. 922 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
214. Id. at 589. A conviction would carry with it a mandatory minimum sentence of five
years.
215. Id. at 589-90.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 590-91 ("[T]he guideline did not violate due process and we stated that the
additional argument that the guideline violated the separation of powers doctrine was merely
a variant of the due process claim." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United
States v. Oransky, 908 F.2d 307, 309 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the requirement of
prosecutor authorization for downward departure does not violate separation of powers
doctrines).
218. 676 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
219. Id. at 1212. The defendant did not, however, argue that all of the sentencing power
had been placed with the prosecutor.
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upon by defendant advance her proposition that the recommendation of the
United States Attorney to impose a sentence below the minimum for a
defendant who offered substantial assistance impermissibly permits
executive interference in the sentencing process. ' 220 The court held that the
prosecutor's discretion to determine the extent of substantial assistance did
not impermissibly interfere with judicial sentencing. 221
3. Fifteen Years Later, a Revised Argument Returns
In United States v. Vargas, the defendant William Vargas pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute one kilogram of heroin. 222 As a result, Vargas was
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 120 months' incarceration
followed by five years' supervised release. 223 Vargas appealed only his
sentence on the ground that imposition of the mandatory minimum violated
the separation of powers doctrine "by vesting excessive sentencing power
in the Executive Branch of government. . .. -224 The district judge
dismissed Vargas's complaints as "'questions of policy and not of
constitutional law. "'225
220. Id. at 1213. Instead, relying on previous decisions regarding the validity of a court's
exclusive parole determinations pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 2841, the district court concluded that
"the sentencing function is not exclusively judicial." Id. at 1213 & n.3. The defendant
argued that allowing the executive to file the motion for substantial assistance placed the
power with an executive officer who would be answerable to Congress, effectively
preserving control for Congress over both the power to determine the laws and the sentence.
The court was not persuaded and instead chose to rely on previous cases that allowed the
judiciary to exercise unrestricted power in determining a defendant's parole. Id. at 1212-13.
221. Id. at 1213 ("[T]he sentencing function is not exclusively judicial and represents
potential influence of other branches."); see also United States v. Spillman, 924 F.2d 721,
724 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that section 5Kl.1 does not delegate judicial authority to the
executive branch, and further noting that Congress has the power to restrict or expand factors
affecting the length of sentences, rendering moot, in the eyes of the court, the separation of
powers argument); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
sentencing was not an inherently judicial function and that the government's authority to
recommend a reduced sentence "was not impermissibly obtrusive" and emphasizing that
there is no constitutional right to substantial assistance); United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d
1341, 1344 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11 th Cir.
1988)) (holding that because the district court has the ultimate authority to grant a downward
variance, separation of powers was not violated).
222. United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL 3228787, at * 1 (2d Cir. Nov. 7,
2006).
223. Id.
224. Id. This functionalist argument accepts that some blending of powers is inherent in
the sentencing process, but expresses alarm at the extent of sentencing power that has been
transferred to the prosecutor. Interestingly, this paraphrase in the court's opinion is an
inaccurate description of what William Vargas actually argued. Vargas argued that due to
the government motion requirement to authorize a departure for substantial assistance, it was
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine for the executive to exercise all sentencing
power and act as de facto judges. See infra Part II.B.3.b (discussing Vargas's petition for
rehearing en banc and the distinctions between Vargas and Huerta).
225. Vargas, 2006 WL 3228787, at * 1 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 3-4).
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On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Vargas's separation of powers
argument was foreclosed by the court's previous decision in Huerta.226
While Vargas argued that Huerta did not control his appeal because that
case held only that the usurpation of some judicial discretion does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine, the Second Circuit determined
that "[t]he distinction between usurpation of such discretion and the
accretion of power in one branch ... is one without a difference." 22 7 The
court was not persuaded by Vargas's assertion that criticisms of mandatory
minimums had reached a "critical mass." 228 Once again, the court simply
reiterated that the ability to create mandatory minimums is well within the
legislative power of Congress. 229 The Second Circuit held that, absent an
intervening decision by the Supreme Court, one panel of the court could not
overturn another. 230
4. Functionalism Creates Balance and Efficiency
A functionalist approach would seem to favor the Huerta line of
decisions. Over the years, both courts and academics have employed
various arguments to justify a functionalist approach to the separation of
powers. 231  Perhaps the most famous justification for a functionalist
approach comes from Justice Robert H. Jackson, who said, "While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." 232 Under the functionalist framework, some
blending of powers is permissible as long as the core function of one branch
is not usurped by another. 233
226. Id.
227. Id. at *2. It is important to note that while the court believed it was foreclosed by
Huerta from hearing the argument, this Note asserts that there is a significant distinction
between some sharing of judicial power and Vargas's assertion that the executive was in
control of all sentencing discretion. The court's failure to recognize a distinction represents
one of the ongoing problems with separation of powers cases in the criminal law. Courts
assume that the separation of powers argument will be the same as previous cases. See infra
Part II.B.3 (discussing the Vargas court's assumptions regarding separation of powers
arguments).
228. Vargas, 2006 WL 3228787, at *2 (agreeing with the district court that this was a
matter of policy and not constitutional law).
229. Id. This argument, however, ignores the reality that Congress has created a different
sentencing scheme. For more on this idea, see supra Part II.B.3.b discussing in more detail
Vargas's petition for rehearing en banc.
230. Id.
231. See supra Part I.B.2.a-b (discussing Morrison and Mistretta and the Court's
functionalist analysis).
232. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
233. See supra Part I.B.2.a (discussing the Court's decision in Morrison).
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Professor Paul Conkin writes that Madison's idea of balance in
government required something other than complete separation. 234  He
suggests that Madison's now familiar idea of checks and balances between
branches of government was a hybrid of evolving eighteenth-century ideas
of separation of powers attributed most prominently to philosophers
Montesquieu, John Locke, and even libertarian theory.2 35 Montesquieu
adopted the classifications of legislative, executive, and judicial. 236
Professor Conkin emphasizes that while Montesquieu wanted different
persons to exercise different functions of government in an effort to avoid
tyranny, "he never embraced an absolute form of separation and always
blended ideas of separation with ideas of balance. '237  Accordingly,
Madison's conception was not of total branch isolation but rather of
independence in functioning. In order to allow for push and pull, each
branch was given specific checks that provided the power to push back
against the other branches. 238
Professor Peter L. Strauss provides important insight into the dichotomy
between formalism and functionalism in analyzing Supreme Court
separation of powers cases.239  Professor Strauss suggests that both
formalism and functionalism offer peculiar benefits to the Supreme Court
when it confronts separation of powers issues. 240 Formalism, according to
Professor Strauss, offers stability, clear rules, and the "assurance that
conduct can and will be governed by law. ' 241 However, formalism also
presents two problems: (1) inflexibility in the face of change, and (2) the
234. See Paul K. Conkin, Self-Evident Truths 158 (1974). "[Balance in government] is
an active, functional principle, not a geometric one." Id.; see also Flaherty, supra note 90, at
1802 n.407 (clarifying that while Federalists did not necessarily argue in favor of the modem
construct of balancing powers, the Federalist arguments for the Constitution "better comport
with modem functionalism than formalism").
235. See Conkin, supra note 234, at 154-56 (discussing the development of separation of
powers ideas as a reaction to the Puritan Revolution and the subsequent ascendancy of a
single assembly that dissolved the former mix of interests in government in favor of one
government body). The philosopher John Locke divided government into three branches:
"legislative, executive (including judicial), and federative (primarily foreign policy)." Id. at
155. He was concerned that if the men who made the laws were also the enforcers, "the
temptation to exploit laws for private advantage would be overwhelming." Id. The Whigs,
prominent players in American Revolutionary thought, also rallied against members of
Parliament who traded their independence for royal favors. Id. However, even the Whigs
combined ideas of separation with balance, "valuing balance and independence more than
isolation." Id. at 156.
236. See id. at 156.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 158-59. However, this role of checking the power of other branches is not the
primary role of each branch. Id. at 159.
239. See Strauss, supra note 100, at 488-89 (discussing how the Supreme Court has
attempted to accommodate the complex structure of the federal government).
240. Id. at 511-12 (questioning whether "aggrandizement" of one branch's power at the
expense of another is the key to triggering a formalist analysis).
241. Id. at 512.
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invitation to evade the rules because they are so clear.24 2 Functionalism, on
the other hand, provides a holistic approach that addresses the particular
circumstances of a specific dispute. 243 The functionalist approach provides
(1) the possibility of accommodating needed change, and (2) a response to
the formalist problem of evasion of specific rules. 244 Particularly in cases
involving judicial power in the constitutional scheme, the modem Court
seems committed to functionalism. 245 While accepting that functionalism
has its dangers, Professor Strauss asserts that formalism is incapable of
describing the modem U.S. government. 246
5. Sentencing Power Has Not Shifted to Prosecutors
Some commentators seek to moderate the claim that under the Guidelines
sentencing power has shifted to the prosecutor. Professor Frank 0.
Bowman believes that the shift in power is not as great as some people
would suggest. 24 7 He suggests that "in order to really control sentences...
a prosecutor must be willing to hide facts from the court. ' 248 Former U.S.
Attorney James B. Bums, Assistant U.S. Attorney Barry Rand Elden, and
former Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian W. Blanchard argue that the shift in
power due to the Guidelines has not been from the judiciary to the
executive but rather from the judiciary to Congress. 249 Bums et al. assert
that the prosecutor's power at sentencing has not been substantially altered
by the Guidelines.250 Instead, these authors believe that the apparent
increase in the prosecutor's power only exists when viewed relative to the
242. Id. ("[Tihe drafters or interpreters of a Constitution .. . could easily foresee a
corresponding difficulty arising out of the attempt to specify permitted allocations.").
243. Id.
244. Id. However, these approaches also give rise to questions about the legitimacy of
judicial action. Further, Professor Peter Strauss acknowledges that "from a practical
perspective.... [the] functional standard has only short-term advantages in dealing with the
evasion theme." Id. Interestingly, Professor Strauss does not seem to think that there will be
a resolution between formalism and functionalism in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and
that in fact judges will require both techniques. See id.
245. Id. at 515 ("[Tlhe Court has unmistakably chosen a functional approach over a
formal approach .... ).
246. Id. at 511-12 ("The government we have built and now live with has attained a
complexity and intermarriage of function that beggars the rationalistic tripartite schemes of
the eighteenth century."). According to Professor Strauss, formalism serves as a proxy for
justices who are "unwilling to trust their inheritors-or even themselves." Id. at 526.
247. See Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other
Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 679,
724-26. Professor Bowman explains that while the Sentencing Guidelines may restrict the
facts that a judge can consider in setting a sentence, the prosecutor has discretion "only to
the degree that she is free to choose either to present or to withhold inculpatory facts." Id. at
726.
248. Id. at 729. Once again, this suggests that because prosecutors are inherently ethical
people, there is little chance that prosecutors could control sentencing.
249. See James B. Burns et al., We Make the Better Target (But the Guidelines Shifted
Power from the Judiciary to Congress, Not from the Judiciary to the Prosecution), 91 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1317, 1318 (1997).
250. See id.
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judiciary's loss of power.25 1 By designating the factors to be considered in
sentencing and the weight they should be afforded, the Sentencing
Guidelines may have drastically reduced the judiciary's power, but they did
not increase the prosecutor's power.252
B. The Government's Sole Discretion to Move for a Downward Departure
for Substantial Assistance Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. United States v. Federico
In United States v. Federico, a drug dealer pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. 253 Dennis Federico argued that 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) impermissibly placed judicial power with the prosecutor by
requiring a government motion before a judge could grant a downward
departure for substantial assistance. 2 54 The court held that the statutory
clause requiring a government motion to trigger a downward departure for
substantial assistance violated the constitutional requirement of separation
of judicial and prosecutorial powers. 255 Noting that the triggering clause
forced the prosecutor directly into the judicial sentencing role, the court
determined that the clause impermissibly gave the prosecutor a veto power
over the judge's sentencing discretion.256 While the government argued
that in instances where the prosecutor moved for a downward departure the
judge was the final decision maker, the court held that the prosecutor was
the final decision maker when he did not move for a downward
departure.2 57 Furthermore, the court noted that, while Congress could
eliminate substantial assistance, once Congress determined that the right
existed, the clause was subject to separation of powers restrictions. 25 8
251. Id. (suggesting that the prosecutor's power only appears to have increased due to the
loss of power in the judiciary).
252. Id. Even if this is true and prosecutors have not seen an increase in power, by
diminishing the power of the judiciary to check the executive, it still seems that the overall
effect is to increase the power of the prosecution in sentencing.
253. United States v. Federico, 732 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (effectively
limited to its facts by United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
sentencing is not an inherently judicial function)).
254. Id. at 1009-10.
2255. See id. at 1013.
256. Id. at 1013-14.
257. See id. at 1011.
258. Id. It should be noted that one year later, in United States v. Ayarza, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing was not an inherently judicial function
and that as then utilized the government motion requirement did not violate separation of
powers. 874 F.2d 647. While Ayarza did not cite to Federico or directly overrule it, the
language of Federico appears to be an anomaly.
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2. United States v. Ming He
In United States v. Ming He,259 defendant Ming He pled guilty to
racketeering and subsequently entered into a cooperation agreement with
the government. 260 In return for Ming He's cooperation, the government
agreed to file a motion pursuant to section 5Kl.1 acknowledging his
cooperation and requesting a reduced sentence. 261  In the end, the
government was not happy with Ming He's assistance and, while still
making a motion under section 5K1. 1, "disparaged [his] assistance." 262
In his opinion, Judge Richard Cardamone analyzed the impact of the
5Kl.1 motions on sentencing. 263 The judge noted that, absent a motion
from the prosecutor, the court was unable to "consider such factors as the
usefulness, truthfulness, timeliness, and extent of the cooperating witness's
assistance." 264  Judge Cardamone noted that prior to the Sentencing
Guidelines and section 5Kl.1, district judges had the discretion to
determine whether to reduce a defendant's sentence based on his
assistance. 265  Judge Cardamone explained that, while the Sentencing
Guidelines transferred this discretion from the judges to the prosecutors,26 6
"it is equally true that a sentencing court is particularly well-positioned-
because of its experience-to evaluate the moral worthiness, contrition, and
rehabilitation of a defendant. ' '2 67 Judge Cardamone acknowledged that the
substantial assistance motion has been a useful tool in managing a
prosecutor's heavy caseload, but was particularly troubled by the transfer of
power coupled with a lack of any visible standards. 268
259. 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996).
260. Id. at 785-86.
261. Id. at 786.
262. Id. The 5Kl.1 letter detailed Ming He's reluctance to acknowledge his role in a
murder conspiracy and his attempts to minimize his role in criminal activity. Id.
263. Id. at 788 (noting that "a § 5Kl letter allows the district court one of the few
opportunities it has to depart downwardly from the Sentencing Guidelines' somewhat rigid
grid").
264. Id. (noting that the factors are then weighed by the sentencing judge to determine the
"appropriate reduction" in sentence).
265. Id.
266. Id. (noting that prosecutors are "uniquely fit" to determine whether substantial
assistance has occurred).
267. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1103 (2d Cir. 1992))
(reiterating that a court may not depart from the guidelines sua sponte).
268. Id. ("[T]he absence of any 'visible standards to guide the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion' . . . has made the transfer of authority from judges to prosecutors especially
troubling." (internal citations omitted)). Judge Richard Cardamone went on to determine
that in order to balance the prosecutor's broad discretion in the area of substantial assistance,
courts "must be especially vigilant to preserve a cooperating witness's procedural rights." Id.
at 789.
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3. Vargas Brief and Petition for Rehearing En Banc
a. Brief ofAppellant
It is important to discuss the Vargas brief and petition for rehearing en
banc separately because Vargas argues that the Second Circuit's original
opinion misconstrues Vargas's separation of powers argument. 269 Vargas
argued that because prosecutors select both the charge and "hold the key to
unlock the judge's ability to depart downwards... below the mandatory
minimum[,]" the cumulative effect of executive control "has led to theCunit[ing] [of] the power to prosecute and the power to sentence within one
Branch.'"270 Vargas conceded that Congress has the power to create
mandatory minimums, but argued that it does not have "the power to give
the Executive Branch exclusive sentencing discretion."'271 Vargas
postulated that, "[i]n a system where over 95 percent of defendants plead
guilty, prosecutors consequently act as de facto judges" in potential
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 272
In his reply brief, Vargas noted that while the government claimed that
Vargas's challenge has "essentially" been addressed, Huerta held only that
sentencing is not solely a judicial prerogative and "that the Judicial Branch
does not possess exclusive sentencing authority. ' 273 Vargas reiterated that
"Huerta does not reach the different challenge... to the current accretion
of de facto sentencing power by the Executive. '274 Vargas asserted that
Huerta "has no connection to reality today. '275 He noted that "[t]oday,
every participant in the federal criminal justice system... knows that in
cases where the mandatory minimum is present securing [a Guidelines
section 5Kl.1] motion from the Executive Branch is the single path to a
chance of a manageable sentence. '276
269. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Second Circuit's Vargas opinion).
270. Brief for the Appellant at 3, United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL
3228787 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2006) (citation omitted).
271. Id. at 4 n.3.
272. Id. at 4 (citing U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics fig.C (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/Fig-c.PDF)
(showing the guilty plea rate from 1999 to 2003)).
273. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL
3228787 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2006) (citing Brief of Government at 4, Vargas, 2006 WL 3228787
(No. 05-4627-CR)).
274. Id. (noting that because Huerta was decided only twenty months after the
implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the court was unable to anticipate the growth
in the government's de facto sentencing power).
275. Id. (emphasizing that in Huerta, the court believed that a prosecutor's decision of
what to charge was "far more intrusive" than the limited power of § 3553(e)).
276. Id. (noting additionally that the substantial assistance motion has become "the coin
of the realm within our system").
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b. Vargas Petition for Rehearing En Banc: The Attack Refined
In his petition for rehearing en banc, Vargas first argued that the Second
Circuit incorrectly held that Huerta had previously decided the issues
presented in his case. 277 He argued that the Second Circuit's assertion that
any differences between the two cases were "a distinction ... without a
difference" was incorrect. 27 8 To the contrary, Vargas insisted that "[t]he
distinction is one with an enormous difference." 279 While Huerta held that
the sentencing function was shared between all three branches of
government and that Congress did not violate the separation of powers by
creating mandatory minimums, Vargas argued that "the current accretion of
sentencing power in the Executive Branch in mandatory minimum cases
violates the Separation of Powers doctrine because it combines the power to
charge and the absolute and unreviewable power to control sentence in one
branch." 280
Vargas then further refined his separation of powers argument. He
asserted that, "if Congress required the Judiciary to abide by prosecutors'
sentenc[ing] 'recommendations,"' a separation of powers violation would
exist. 28 1 The analysis does not change simply "because § 3553(e) applies
only to a subset of []cases." 2 82 Accordingly, if uniting the power to charge
and sentence in one branch is a violation, "it is no less so merely because
the Executive does not possess this power to control all sentences."
283
4. Do Criminal Law Cases Require a Different
Separation of Powers Analysis?
As this Note has previously indicated, scholars regularly debate whether
a functionalist or formalist approach is more appropriate when analyzing a
separation of powers issue. 2 84 In her article Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, Professor Rachel E. Barkow notes that these arguments are
generally based on the merits of the analysis and do not focus on the type of
case. 285 Professor Barkow suggests that the Supreme Court should apply a
formalist analysis to criminal law separation of powers cases, which would
277. Petition for Appellant at 4, United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL
3228787 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2006).
278. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Id. at 5.
280. Id. It should be noted that the power is not completely unreviewable. See Wade v.
United States, 504 U.S. 181, 184 (1992); see also supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
281. Petition for Appellant, supra note 277, at 5.
282. Id. (alteration in original).
283. Id.
284. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Supreme Court's various approaches to analyzing
separation of powers problems).
285. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev.
989, 993 (2006) (noting that "[c]riminal cases are not distinguished from administrative law
cases").
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drastically change the outcome of Mistretta and Booker.286 She argues that
the existing functional approach to separation of powers in the criminal law
"cannot be squared with constitutional theory or sound institutional
design. ' '287 Professor Barkow suggests that there are three possible ways to
treat separation of powers issues in a criminal action.28 8 The first approach
would be to treat criminal cases no differently than administrative law
cases. 289  This would entail some blending of powers to allow the
government to better respond to criminal matters.290  Following the
administrative model, other checks would be put in place to ensure that the
government does not abuse its power.291
The second approach identified by Professor Barkow would be to
distinguish separation of powers analysis between criminal law and
administrative law. 292 Conceding that state power is at its apex in criminal
matters, this view would require strict adherence to the separation of powers
doctrine in criminal matters. 293
Finally, Professor Barkow identifies a third and current approach in
which criminal matters are not distinguished from administrative law cases.
Here, the Court has been even more permissive in the criminal context than
it has been in civil cases. 294 While administrative agencies must adhere to
specific structural and process restrictions and remain subject to judicial
review, these institutional checks are severely lacking in criminal
matters.295 Professor Barkow notes,
The current arrangement therefore takes the worst possible approach to
separation of powers in the criminal law. The protection provided by the
separation of powers is relaxed, but nothing takes its place. As a result,
the potential for government abuse is ... higher in the criminal context
than in other regulatory spheres.
2 96
286. Id. at 1041-44 (explaining that a separation of powers analysis would have exposed
the expansion of legislative and executive power without a sufficient judicial check).
Professor Rachel Barkow also argues that the Sentencing Reform Act operates to transfer
significant discretionary power from the judicial branch to Congress and the executive. Id. at
1042. Similarly, she argues that the Supreme Court's failure to focus on separation of
powers and to "overlook completely the constitutional problems with mandatory minimum
sentences" has produced confusion in the Court's analysis. Id. at 1043.
287. Id. at 993.
288. Id. at 992.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 992-93. This would be the formalist approach. This scenario assumes that
in criminal matters, an individual's liberty or life are at stake. This view would allow for
blending in civil matters but not in criminal matters. Id.
294. Id. at 993.
295. Id. Unlike the checks provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, the only
safeguards in criminal matters come from constitutional individual rights provisions.
Professor Barkow believes that these provisions provide inadequate protection against
structural abuses in criminal matters. Id.
296. Id.
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The structural protections present in the administrative context that can
justify some flexibility are absent in the criminal context. 297
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court does not divide separation of
powers cases along substantive lines, Professor Barkow argues that due to
the individual rights at stake in criminal law, the Court should differentiate
between criminal and administrative law when analyzing separation of
powers issues. 298 She begins by returning to the structure and text of the
Constitution. 299  According to Professor Barkow, the framers were
particularly focused on the potential for legislative encroachment to the
judicial power over crime. 300 Thus, Article I places "express limits on
legislative exercise of judicial power."'301 By establishing the judiciary as a
key check on the legislative process, separation of powers attempts to
monitor the threat of discriminatory enforcement of laws. 302
Professor Barkow notes that in addition to separating the legislature from
the judiciary, Article III also provides that all criminal matters must be tried
by a jury.30 3 The jury's unreviewable power to acquit has historically
served as a final check on both the legislature and the judiciary. 30 4
Accordingly, each branch must agree before criminal action can be taken
against an individual. 30 5
Due to prosecutorial control over plea bargaining and the operation of a
broad federal criminal code, Professor Barkow indicates that "the only
process . . . that most defendants receive comes from the prosecutor." 30 6
However, prosecutors operate with little oversight.307 Even more troubling,
the prosecutor investigates the case, decides what to charge and, in a plea
297. Id. at 994.
298. See id. at 1011-12.
299. Id. at 1012.
300. Id. ("The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the
determination of the rights of one person to the 'tyranny of shifting majorities."') (quoting
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring))).
301. Id. at 1013-14 (discussing the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws, prohibitions against suspending habeas corpus, and deterring legislative interference
with judicial functions).
302. Id. at 1014; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
860 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that protection of individual litigants from
legislators susceptible to "majoritarian pressures" was a principle benefit of separating
judicial and legislative powers).
303. See Barkow, supra note 285, at 1015. This was the basis for the Supreme Court's
recent decision to render the Sentencing Guidelines advisory. See supra Part I.A.4
(discussing Booker).
304. Barkow, supra note 285, at 1015 (noting that because a jury must be unanimous, this
in effect requires all members of the community to agree before politicians can impose
criminal punishment).
305. Id. (discussing the framers' decision to weigh the need for government efficiency
against the potential for abuse when the government exercises its criminal power and
favoring limits on federal criminal power).
306. Id. at 1024 (referring to the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines and their expanding
effect on prosecutorial discretion).
307. Id.
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bargaining scenario, decides what plea to accept. 30 8 Unlike administrative
agencies that are subject to a judicial review, prosecutors operate with a
"presumption of regularity" with nearly nonexistent judicial review of their
decisions.309
Separation of powers guards against the accumulation of too much power
in one branch. 310 While suggesting that the Court's complacence in this
area of criminal law may be due to its over-reliance on individual rights
protections, Professor Barkow argues that these rights protections, while
guarding individuals from some police or government abuse, "do not guard
against the same structural abuses as the separation of powers."' 311 Thus,
the current individual rights approach has done nothing to stop the
accumulation of judicial power by the executive. 312
Professor Barkow concludes that criminal law merits greater separation
of powers protection than administrative law and suggests a bright-line rule
analysis similar to the holding in Chadha as a solution. 313 This would
effectively reestablish judicial oversight of the criminal process and provide
a remedy for the current blending of powers, which results in a lack of
significant checks in criminal matters.314
5. Further Criticism of the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power over
Substantial Assistance
Other commentators have criticized the Guidelines on the ground that
they transfer discretionary power to influence sentencing from the judiciary
to the prosecutor. Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky alleges that the Guidelines
represent a significant transfer of discretion from judge to prosecutor. 315
308. Id. at 1025. This scenario is analogous to mandatory minimum drug cases in which
the Drug Enforcement Administration sets up a drug bust for a specific amount triggering the
mandatory minimum, the prosecutor determines what charge to bring, also triggering
mandatory sentences, and then the prosecutor is the only actor who can trigger a downward
departure from the chosen mandatory minimum.
309. Id. at 1015; see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) ("[W]e see no
reason why courts should treat a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion
differently from a prosecutor's other decisions ...."); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
608 (1985) (noting that courts are "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to
prosecute").
310. See Barkow, supra note 285, at 1032-33.
311. Id. at 1032 (suggesting that the Court's willingness to allow a blending of powers
may stem from its confidence in the protection of rights provisions).
312. Id. at 1033.
313. See id. 1036-39 (noting the danger of subtle shifts in judicial authority that have the
effect of limiting judicial authority and discussing the judiciary's lack of perspective due to
desensitization to a criminal system run by prosecutors).
314. See id. at 1053-54 (arguing that this approach would provide protection for
defendants while still allowing Congress the freedom to adapt criminal laws and sentences as
necessary).
315. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 1, at 925 (noting the perception that the
Sentencing Guidelines have shifted sentencing authority from the courts to prosecutors).
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Professor Cynthia Lee argues that the prosecutor's power over substantial
assistance is greater than originally perceived. 316 Professor Lee suggests
that requiring two separate motions, one for departing below the Guidelines
and another for departing below the mandatory minimum, poses serious
policy questions about who gets to decide how substantial the assistance
was. 317 Professor Lee notes that while the motion requirement may have
been intended by Congress to act as a check on judicial discretion and a
method to control backdoor sentencing to avoid the Guidelines, there are
opposing considerations. 318
First, the prosecutor is not a neutral party. 319 His "interests as advocate
and adversary may conflict with Congress' interests in promoting
uniformity and reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity. ' 320 Second,
while a prosecutor may be capable of independence at the inception of trial,
the process of trial may make it more difficult for a prosecutor to maintain
neutrality.32 1 Third, there are no uniform standards for determining the
extent of a sentencing departure. 322 Allowing the prosecutor to determine
whether a departure is warranted "reintroduces the problem of disparity into
the sentencing process. ' 323 As the Supreme Court has previously noted,
most prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions are not subject to
review. 324 Finally, due to the private nature of prosecutorial discretion,
Professor Lee asserts that, unlike judicial decisions, there is no check on the
prosecutor's decision absent a gross constitutional violation.325
Narcotics cases in particular provide an illustration of the enormous
increase in prosecutorial power. Professor Ian Weinstein identifies
accelerating over-criminalization, increased use of mandatory minimums,
and harsh penalties as three trends that give prosecutors significantly more
316. See Lee, supra note 45, at 234 ("[T]he prosecutor not only controls whether or not a
departure can be granted, but also, through its power to withhold a second substantial
assistance motion, the extent of the departure.").
317. Id. (arguing that the judge and not the prosecutor should determine to what extent a
defendant's cooperation should be reflected in the sentence).
318. Id. at 236.
319. Id.
320. Id. (noting that prosecutors will use plea bargains to manipulate a Guidelines
sentence, particularly in the case of sympathetic defendants).
321. Id. at 236-37 (asserting that because a prosecutor is so close to the trial process, the
judge may be better equipped to act with neutrality in determining the departure).
322. Id. at 237 (noting that different U.S. Attorneys' Offices utilize varying criteria to
determine whether substantial assistance has been given).
323. Id.
324. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
325. See Lee, supra note 45, at 237-38 (explaining that the prosecutor's charging and
bargaining decisions are not subject to judicial review and noting that, to the contrary,judicial decisions are "aired in open court where the judge must state her reasons for the
sentence imposed" and any decision to depart from a Guideline range is subject to appellate
review); see also Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note, 5K1.] and Substantial Assistance Departure:
The Illusory Carrot of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1519, 1544
(1991) (noting that "by allowing the prosecutor to make the threshold determination as to
whether cooperation is substantial,. the Commission creates the danger of coupling
subjectivity with one party's understandable desire to further its own interests").
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control over sentencing in narcotics cases. 326 By combining these factors,
"[t]he bottom line is that a federal prosecutor has the practical power to
select among a wide range of sentences." 327 To clarify his point, Professor
Weinstein crafts an illustrative hypothetical:
Consider Mr. X, a defendant arrested in Manhattan for possession of five
grams of crack cocaine. Assume that Mr. X has a prior state conviction
for sale of a small amount of heroin and that his co-defendant Mr. Y kept
a gun in a drawer in the kitchen of the apartment in which the two were
arrested. Suppose the government alleges that Mr. X was a courier for
Mr. Y and that Mr. Y had been observed at the arrest location for six
months and is believed to sell about fifty grams of crack a week.328
According to Professor Weinstein, "Mr. X could be charged under three
different subsections of 21 U.S.C. § 841, which prohibits narcotics
trafficking." 329 Each would have a different guidelines sentence and a
possible mandatory minimum, the application of which would increase
pressure on the defendant to cooperate in order to mitigate his sentence. 33
0
In this example, the prosecutor's discretion appears to create the power to
control the defendant's sentence.
6. Historically, Separating Powers Promoted Efficiency
Historian Ann Stuart Anderson, in her essay A 1787 Perspective on
Separation of Powers, asserts that separation of powers has been
misunderstood to express a desire to fragment government power and
sacrifice the capacity to govern in favor of individual liberty. 331 Instead,
Anderson suggests that separation of powers was intended both to secure
liberty and ensure competent government. 332 According to Anderson,
powers were divided to effectuate their use and to prevent government
deadlock.333 The framers' purpose in providing separated powers was to
create more possibilities for the use of government powers, not to thwart
326. See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 87, 108 (2003).
327. See id. at 112.
328. Id. at 108.
329. Id.
330. See id. at 108-10.
331. See Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787 Perspective on Separation of Powers, in
Separation of Powers-Does It Still Work? 138, 143 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman
eds., 1986).
332. Id. at 144; see also Flaherty, supra note 90, at 1805 ("[Federalism] seeks more than
gridlock. For all that it promoted balance and expanded accountability, separation of powers
was also intended to ensure that government had enough energy to do what it had to do once
it did decide to act.").
333. See Anderson, supra note 331, at 144 (suggesting that although separation of powers
assumes the framers' awareness of the dangers of too little government, they did not intend
for all three branches to be equal in power). "[T]he preference for the separation of powers
structure was not only to preserve liberty but also to design a government for effective
legislation and 'well-administered' laws." Id. 145.
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them.334 Checks, by their nature, provide a branch with a power not within
its core function. 335 Anderson asserts that the purpose of the check is to
promote efficiency by allowing government to continue once all the checks
have been exhausted. 336 Anderson believes that the separation of powers
was the framers' attempt to minimize the historical drawbacks of
incompetence and destruction of liberty inherent in democracy. 337  In
response to criticisms that separation of powers is archaic and prevents
effective dealing with modem problems, Anderson poses the questions,
"What free government today deals effectively with modem problems? It is
in the nature of freedom that there is a cost. ' 3 3 8 Anderson concludes that
separation of powers, now more than ever, is essential to efficient
government.
Part II of this Note described the circuit court cases that have addressed
whether the government motion requirement violates the separation of
powers doctrine, and the most recent separation of powers challenge to the
government motion requirement for substantial assistance. Part II also
discussed academic arguments both supporting and opposing the current
government motion requirement for substantial assistance and presented
challenges to the Supreme Court's current separation of powers analytical
framework in criminal law cases. This Note now turns to a discussion of
possible solutions to the separation of powers problem by examining
potential judicial and congressional responses to the problem.
III. RECASTING THE GOVERNMENT MOTION REQUIREMENT
Part III of this Note argues that the government motion requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing the
executive to control both charging and sentencing in mandatory minimum
cases. This Note concedes, however, that due to concerns regarding
prosecutorial discretion and judicial efficiency, courts appear unready to
reexamine the separation of powers violation this Note argues is inherent in
the statute. Therefore, Part III of this Note contends that, while it would be
appropriate for courts to invalidate the government motion requirement for
substantial assistance, in the absence of such judicial action, Congress
should eliminate the government motion requirement for substantial
assistance and instead require both judicial and executive input with respect
to determining whether a defendant has provided substantial assistance.
Additionally, this Note agrees with past commentators that, as part of the
solution to repair the substantial assistance mechanism, Congress should
334. Id. at 145 (noting that this is contrary to the popular idea that separation of powers
was designed to thwart the use of government powers).
335. See Id. at 153.
336. Id. 153-54 (discussing how a system without checks would result in angry deadlock
in a scenario where the legislative and executive branches disagreed, but noting that the
checks provided to each branch allow for compromise and effective government).
337. Id. at 142.
338. Id. at 161.
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define with particularity what constitutes substantial assistance in the
interest of reducing sentencing disparity and correcting the separation of
powers problems embedded in the current government motion requirement.
A. The Government Motion Requirement Violates the Separation of
Powers Doctrine Under Both Formalist and Functionalist Frameworks
This Note argues that giving the executive exclusive power to trigger a
downward departure for substantial assistance in mandatory minimum cases
violates the separation of powers doctrine. According to Justice Scalia's
formalist reasoning, articulated in his dissents in Morrison and Mistretta,
any commingling of government power that is not specifically provided for
by the text of the Constitution is impermissible. 339 Under this formalist
framework, which requires strict division of power between the three
branches of government, placing sentencing power in the executive branch
is a clear usurpation of judicial power. 340 For Justice Scalia, it is the
commingling itself that violates the Constitution and threatens liberty.34'
No matter what the end result, Justice Scalia argues that any unenumerated
commingling of power, even if it results in a novel rearrangement of power
that on its face appears beneficial to the working government, is absolutely
unacceptable. 342 Both Justice Scalia and Professor Barkow assert that
specific rules of law may be the best way to protect individual liberty in
criminal cases. 343 For Justice Scalia, adhering to the enumerated text of the
Constitution grounds the rules in laws that can be logically articulated. 344
For Professor Barkow, a formalist division of power is the best means to
reestablish judicial oversight and meaningful checks on executive power in
the criminal process where individual liberty is most at risk.345 Both of
these arguments are compelling. Assuming that sentencing is an inherently
judicial power, placing that power in the hands of the executive, regardless
of the practical outcome, is a clear violation of separation of powers.
One difficulty, however, with advocating a strict division of power in
criminal law is that such division may actually hinder the defense counsel's
ability to act in the best interests of her clients. Sentencing is traditionally a
shared function, insofar as Congress legislates, the executive charges, and
the judge sentences. While there are significant problems with the amount
of power the current substantial assistance triggering mechanism provides
to the prosecutor, cooperation in general is seen as desirable and is often the
only means available to a defendant to receive a reduced sentence. Part of
339. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 184-92 and
accompanying text.
340. Cf supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (indicating that the Constitution was
a prescribed structure).
341. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 149, 293 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
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ensuring effective cooperation entails an ongoing dialogue between the
prosecutor and the judge. It seems reasonable to allow the prosecutor to
have some input regarding the usefulness of a defendant's cooperation
when the defendant is sentenced. What is unreasonable, and arguably
unnecessary, is to allow the prosecutor exclusive power to control whether
the judge may consider a defendant's cooperation when imposing a
sentence.
The formalist argument may also be vulnerable to the Court's re-
characterization of the power to grant substantial assistance.346 While any
unenumerated commingling of power is a violation of separation of powers,
finding a violation assumes that granting a downward departure for
substantial assistance is a judicial power inherent in the judiciary's
traditional control over the sentencing process. In Wade, however, the
Court protected the prosecutor's decision to refuse substantial assistance as
part of prosecutorial discretion. 347 While the issue was not reached in
Wade, it is conceivable that the Court might characterize substantial
assistance motions and cooperation in general as an extension of the
prosecutor's charging power or as a necessary tool to carry out a recognized
executive power. 348
There are, however, reasons to assume that sentencing power is
inherently a judicial function. In Mistretta, the Court noted that
"substantive judgment in the field of sentencing [is] appropriate to the
Judicial Branch. ' 349 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that, "[f]or more than a century, federal judges have enjoyed wide
discretion to determine the appropriate sentence in individual cases."350
Similarly, in Booker, the Court emphasized the importance of judicial
discretion, the judiciary's unique ability to consider all relevant factors in
sentencing, and the dangers of expanding executive power.351 While the
legislative branch has instituted mandatory minimum sentencing schemes
since early in American history, it is true that the power to determine the
extent of punishment in criminal sentences has never been expressly given
to any one branch of government. 352 Nevertheless, Mistretta's language
346. But see supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
348. Cf supra Part I.A.3 (identifying the courts' deference to prosecutorial discretion).
But see supra notes 319-23 and accompanying text (arguing that a prosecutor's involvement
in the adversarial process mitigates against characterizing substantial assistance as an
extension of charging power).
349. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989); see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 n. 15 (1988) (noting that powers "judicial in their nature" involved
"judgment and discretion").
350. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390; see also supra Part L.A (discussing the historical role
of judges in the sentencing process).
351. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200, 257 (2005) (noting that "[p]rosecutors
would thus exercise a power the Sentencing Act vested in judges: the power to decide,
based on relevant information about the offense and the offender, which defendants merit
heavier punishment"); see also supra Part I.A.4.
352. See U.S. Const. arts. I-II; see also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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suggests that the judicial branch's power inherently includes its discretion
to create individualized sentences in criminal cases. 353 Maintaining the
integrity of the judiciary is essential to protecting parties from legislative
and executive pressure. 354
While it seems that some commingling of power is accepted among
branches of the government, 355 never has the Constitution or the Supreme
Court allowed for the combining of all the power to charge and control
sentencing in one branch. 356 By granting the executive the sole triggering
mechanism that allows the judge to consider a defendant's cooperation and
insulating the prosecutor's substantial assistance decisions from judicial
scrutiny under the guise of prosecutorial discretion, the central judicial
function of acting as a check on the executive branch has been usurped.357
As the Court in Mistretta indicated, placing all the power in one branch
should surely amount to a violation of the separation of powers. 358
This Note proposes that while adopting a formalist approach in criminal
law matters is an appealing solution, in the case of substantial assistance the
formalist analysis is unnecessary to prove a violation. The reality is that the
Supreme Court appears comfortable utilizing a functional analysis in
criminal law separation of powers cases. 359 However, as noted above, even
under the functionalist approach where some commingling of powers is
acceptable in the interests of efficiency and the larger goal of a workable
government, giving the executive the sole power to trigger downward
departures for substantial assistance is a violation. 360 As Vargas noted, it is
not necessary to determine to what degree sentencing is a core judiciary
function because in the case of substantial assistance in mandatory
353. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390; see also U.S. Const. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 1; Intermill &
Martin, supra note 99, at 414 ("The core function of courts is the exercise of discretion to
decide individual cases fairly.").
354. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(noting that an independent judiciary protects parties from legislative and executive pressure
on judicial decision making); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1180 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he[] most significant role[]" for
judges is "to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occasional excesses of
th[e] popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system
that are precisely designed to prohibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular
will").
355. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of a functionalist analysis
allowing for some blending of power between branches of government).
356. Cf U.S. Const. arts. I-II; see also supra notes 99, 191 and accompanying text.
357. This raises the issues of jurisdiction stripping and the power of Article III courts,
both of which are beyond the scope of this Note.
358. Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 n.17 (1989); see also supra Part
I.B.2.b (discussing Mistretta and the potential constitutional issues inherent in placing too
much power in one branch).
359. See supra Part I.B.2.
360. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Supreme Court's separation of powers
jurisprudence).
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minimum cases the judiciary has been stripped of all power.361 Even
accepting arguendo that sentencing is a shared function among Congress,
the executive, and the judiciary, this would still not justify the current
government motion requirement that places all the power to charge and
sentence with the executive. 362
Assuming that there is a violation, according to Justices Jackson and
White's functionalist formulations, the Court would still be required to
balance the interests of the government in maintaining absolute control over
the triggering mechanism with the defendant's personal liberty interests. 363
It is first important to note that cooperation can be, and often is, provided
outside of the mandatory minimum context. 364 In non-mandatory minimum
cases, the government regularly offers evidence of the defendant's
cooperation to be considered by the judge at sentencing. The statutory
triggering mechanism is not required to induce a defendant's cooperation.
Therefore, there must be some reason beyond simply inducing cooperation
that justifies the government's triggering mechanism.
This Note proposes that the most compelling reason is prosecutorial
leverage over a defendant. It seems likely that the government would argue
that the triggering mechanism is necessary to assist in efficient law
enforcement. 365  Controlling the triggering mechanism gives the
prosecution significant leverage that allows it to apprehend low-level
criminals, to turn them against their criminal associates, and to apprehend
people higher up the criminal food chain. While cooperation is an
important part of modem law enforcement, it is not so clear that the heavy
leverage provided by allowing the government to control the triggering
mechanism is necessary. 366 Are there really so many cases where this
heavy leverage plays a significant role in apprehending criminals? Judging
by the number of non-mandatory minimum cases where cooperation is
considered at sentencing, it is clear that defendants are perfectly willing to
cooperate if doing so will reduce their sentences.
Another argument might be that providing such heavy leverage to the
prosecution enables it to enlist more quasi-law enforcement officers who
will make cases for agents. It could be argued that commandeering
criminals to investigate their friends requires less effort on the part of actual
law enforcement officials. It is possible that utilizing these quasi-law
enforcement officers allows for less risk to real police officers and,
361. Cf supra Part II.B.3 (noting that separation of powers would be violated if all the
power of one branch was wielded by the same hands that possessed all the power of another
branch).
362. Interestingly, Professor Strauss's query as to whether "aggrandizement" triggers a
formalist analysis would also support defendant Vargas's argument. See supra note 240 and
accompanying text. In the case of substantial assistance, the executive, not an agency, has
upset the tripartite balance by assuming sentencing power at the expense of the judiciary.
363. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Justice White's functionalist dissents).
364. See supra Part I.A. 1-2.
365. See supra Part I.A.2.
366. See supra Part I.A. 1.
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specifically, undercover agents. Furthermore, because these agents are not
tied down directing low-level criminal activity, this option allows for more
effective use of law enforcement resources to apprehend upper-level
criminals. While all of these benefits seem reasonable, it is still unclear
why the government requires such heavy leverage. Law enforcement
officials readily admit that, when a criminal defendant is asked to
cooperate, rarely is the answer no.3 67
There is arguably another cost to this commandeering of quasi-law
enforcement officers. Because they are criminals and not trained law
enforcement officers, there is a much greater risk that the rules will not be
followed. These quasi-agents are largely unsupervised, and it seems that
their quasi-law enforcement activities run a significant risk of ensnaring
otherwise innocent defendants. Ultimately, rules are rules. While not
definitive, the fact that these quasi-agents operate with little or no
supervision seems to cut against allowing the government to wield such
heavy leverage.
Another problem with allowing the government to utilize such heavy
leverage is that it significantly diminishes the autonomy of the criminal
defendant. It seems clear that, for the most part, defendants want to
cooperate. However, giving the government such heavy leverage allows
prosecutors to demand levels of cooperation that may place the defendant
unfairly at risk. While there is no easy way to evaluate how much risk a
defendant would be willing to assume absent the government's leverage,
given the defendant's desire to cooperate and receive a reduced sentence, he
may place himself in greater danger for fear that the government will not
grant him a 5K1.1 letter. Additionally, although the defendant may place
himself at great risk in response to the government's heavy leverage, the
only guarantee a defendant has that his cooperation will be rewarded is the
good faith of the prosecutor. 368 While prosecutorial good faith is not
addressed here, it is important to note that application of section 5K1.1 is
irregular across districts. 369 This is not to say that prosecutors act in bad
faith, but only to point out that discretion varies when exercised by different
people. While impossible to explore, it seems likely that the same set of
facts would result in substantially different assistance outcomes depending
on whose discretion is applied. 370
All of these considerations must then be weighed against the defendant's
strong interest in his personal liberty. 371 Criminal cases have the highest
cost for defendants. 372  A defendant's failure to receive a downward
departure for substantial assistance can result in a significant increase in jail
367. See supra Part I.A. 1.
368. See supra Part I.A. 1.
369. See supra Part I.A. 1.
370. See supra Part I.A.1.
371. Cf supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's application of
an alternate balancing test).
372. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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time. Given that undue incarceration is the ultimate loss of liberty (next to
the death penalty), it seems difficult to square this with the government's
need to maintain heavy leverage over cooperating defendants. This Note
argues that even under a functionalist balancing test that accepts judicial
deference to prosecutorial discretion, maintaining the government triggering
mechanism seems unnecessary and unfair.
B. Courts Would Be Justified in Invalidating the
Government Motion Requirement
Unfortunately, it may not be enough for courts simply to call this issue a
policy question for Congress. 373 When there is a blatant violation of the
Constitution, the courts should act as a check on the legislature and the
executive. While the courts may not be able to craft a solution, it is
essential that the Supreme Court signal to the legislature that the current
government motion requirement is impermissible. 374 Sentencing is an area
where the judiciary has unique experience, and by invalidating the
substantial assistance motion, the Supreme Court could protect individual
liberty while also performing its own role as an important check on
executive power.
If the Court is going to effectively spearhead the development of a lasting
solution to the separation of powers problem inherent in allowing the
executive to both charge and sentence, the Court might go one step further
and suggest a means for both the prosecutor and the judiciary to participate
in the substantial assistance process. One possibility is to allow a forum
similar to a safety-valve hearing to determine the appropriate departure for
a defendant's substantial assistance. 375 Unfortunately, this would present
two new problems: (1) allowing judges to interfere with what is currently
the domain of prosecutors would present its own separation of powers
problems; and (2) inevitably, the solution to a separation of powers problem
seems to be to create more process. However, in this case the substantial
assistance motion, including arguments in the safety-valve hearing, or even
in sentencing letters, seems like a minimal addition of process. Regrettably,
neither of these solutions is possible as long as substantial assistance
decisions remain protected by prosecutorial discretion.
373. See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the need to petition the legislature on issues of
policy).
374. Cf Stith & Cabranes, supra note 25, at 173-74 (noting the failure of the judiciary to
actively engage in discussion with the sentencing reform movement during the formation of
the Sentencing Guidelines, and how this failure was unfortunate because "there is no group
better able-by virtue of training, experience, and disinterestedness-to forge a structure for
criminal sentencing that is both workable and fair").
375. If judicial efficiency is truly a concern, the courts might simply allow for evidence of
substantial assistance to be presented at the already in-place safety-valve hearing.
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C. Hightened Deference to Prosecutorial Discretion Increases the Risks to
Defendants but Precludes a Judicial Solution
Courts have misconstrued defendants' arguments against requiring a
government motion for substantial assistance.3 76 In Vargas, the defendant
William Vargas made it very clear that he was not challenging Congress's
power to legislate mandatory minimums or the executive's power to
charge. 3 77 Instead, he solely challenged the accretion of all sentencing and
charging power in the executive branch.3 78 He specifically distinguished
his argument from previous arguments asserting that sentencing was a core
function of the judicial branch, 379 noting that while it is certainly true that
sentencing power has been shared between the executive and the judiciary,
never had the Court permitted all of the power to charge and sentence to be
consolidated in the hands of one branch of the government. 380 However,
the Second Circuit chose to disregard this new distinction.38 1
Unfortunately, this response seems to be indicative of the prevailing
judicial attitude, favoring a further pooling of charging and sentencing
power in the executive branch. 382 While it is unclear why the courts are
willing to accept their now significantly diminished role in sentencing, the
reality is that in the system of criminal justice the prosecutor continues to
exercise broad discretion to investigate and charge, and courts are content to
allow continued incursions into their sentencing power.383
In Vargas, the Second Circuit also reasoned that because Congress has
the power to eliminate the substantial assistance motion when legislating
mandatory minimums, executing the statute in a way that offends the
separation of powers doctrine is ultimately acceptable. 384  While the
simplicity of this logic is appealing, this argument assumes that the voters
376. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the court's misrepresentation of Vargas's
argument). In this case, the court incorrectly viewed Huerta as already addressing Vargas's
arguments. See United States v. Vargas, 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL 3228787, at *3 (2d Cir.
2006). In Huerta, the court merely held that moving some sentencing discretion from the
judiciary to the executive did not violate separation of powers or interfere with a core
function of the judiciary. See United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 91-94 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that the executive authority to determine when a judge can consider substantial
assistance as a mitigating factor does not violate separation of powers). Vargas, however,
argued that the current allocation of nearly all the sentencing power in the executive branch
violates the separation of powers because it combines both the power to charge and sentence
in one branch of the government. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 270, at 3.
377. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 270, at 4 n.3; supra notes 157-63 and
accompanying text.
378. See supra Part II.B.3.
379. See supra Part II.A.3.
380. See supra Part L.A (discussing the history of sentencing and the division of
sentencing power among the branches of government).
381. See supra note 227 and accompanying text ("The distinction. .. is one without a
difference.").
382. See supra Part II.A. 1, II.A.4.
383. See supra Part II.A.1.
384. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Vargas court's rationale that, because Congress
could legislate a different system, the abuse of power under this system is permissible).
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would support such a revision to sentencing statutes. It is a long road from
suggesting a revision to actually enacting new legislation. The reality is
that there is a different system in place. 385  The courts must address
separation of powers within the current sentencing scheme, not within a
hypothetical alternative sentencing universe.3 86 And, under the current
sentencing scheme, the charging and sentencing powers are united in the
executive branch. 387
"A Separation of Powers violation would surely exist if Congress
required the Judiciary to abide by prosecutors' sentence
recommendations. " 38 8 As Vargas indicates, this hypothetical illuminates
the separation of powers violation inherent in the current sentencing
scheme.3 89 Uniting the power to charge and sentence in one branch is a
violation of separation of powers. The violation is not validated simply
because the current argument against § 3553(e) applies only to the
executive's power to sentence in the subset of mandatory minimum
cases. 3 90 Within this subset, executive control of sentencing is absolute.
"If uniting the power to control sentence and charge is a violation of
Separation of Powers, it is no less so merely because the Executive does not
possess this power to control all sentences. '391 Unfortunately, the courts
seem perfectly comfortable drawing arbitrary lines defining when a branch
exercises too much power.392 By characterizing the recent objections to the
rule as "distinction[s] without a difference," 393 the court avoided having to
provide a reason for upholding the current sentencing practice. Although
this Note maintains that there is a separation of powers violation, it seems
clear that absent legislative intervention, the courts are unwilling to revisit
the government motion requirement.
Critics have argued that the "gatekeeper" role of prosecutors is
particularly problematic because there is no significant check on the
prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion.394 Under
385. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (defining § 3553(e) and describing the
government motion requirement for substantial assistance).
386. It is also true that Congress could theoretically eliminate all lower federal courts and
leave only the Supreme Court in place. This surely does not imply that lower courts should
not decide the cases before them because the system could be structured differently.
387. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
388. See Petition for Appellant, supra note 277, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also supra Part II.B.3.b.
389. See supra Part II.B.3.
390. See supra Part II.B.3.
391. See Petition for Appellant, supra note 277, at 5; see also supra Part II.B.3.b.
392. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the court's holding in Vargas and indicating that
the court is unwilling to reinvestigate the separation of powers arguments).
393. See United States v. Vargas, No. 05-4627-CR, 2006 WL 3228787, at *2 (2d Cir.
2006). The court's rationale in Vargas is a clear example of this behavior. The court
claimed that Vargas's argument was a distinction "without a difference." Id. It seems, to the
contrary, that the distinction between Vargas and Huerta is one with a significant difference.
Vargas made it very clear that his argument was not about the incursion on judicial
discretion. See Petition for Appellant, supra note 277; see also supra Part II.B.3.b.
394. See supra Part 1I.B.5; see also Proposal on 5K].1, supra note 26, at 1522.
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a judge may not sentence below the mandatory
minimum absent permission from the prosecutor. 395 As noted earlier,
courts may only review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance
motion if the refusal was based on unconstitutional motives or if the
government breached a plea agreement. 396 Because defendants are not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing or discovery as to whether the refusal to
file a motion for substantial assistance was fair, the prosecutor's decision to
file a substantial assistance motion is final. 397 As Professor Lee notes, "If
the prosecutor's assessment of the defendant's assistance-as insubstantial
and thus not deserving of a substantial assistance motion-is incorrect,
there are no procedural mechanisms to check the correctness of this
decision." 398
Assuming, however, that there was some way to demonstrate
unconstitutional motives on the part of the prosecution,399 the hurdles for
proving a selective prosecution claim remain immense. 400 This protection
is quite weak and charges are notoriously difficult to prove. 40 1  As
Professor Barkow noted, "If the Court focused on the structural relationship
among branches instead of on individual defendants, it would see that there
395. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 160 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (noting
that the power to move for a reduction in sentence is reserved to the prosecutor, who is in a
position to determine the "truthfulness and usefulness of [the defendant's] information").
396. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the fact that the Wade court's holding that a district
court may only review a prosecutor's failure to grant a substantial assistance motion was
based on unconstitutional reasons). As the Court in Wade v. United States recognized, the
substantial assistance motion "gives the Government a power, not a duty, to file a motion
when a defendant has substantially assisted." 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992).
397. See Lee, supra note 64, at 173 (explaining that a prosecutor's motion is for the most
part beyond the scope of review). And further, how will a court ever know if there is a
violation if it is not allowed to investigate the circumstances surrounding a prosecutor's
refusal to grant a substantial assistance motion? As Vargas noted in his petition for
rehearing, this is an "impossible burden." See Petition for Appellant, supra note 277, at 7.
398. See Lee, supra note 64, at 173.
399. Again, this Note does not seek to imply that prosecutors act with bad intentions. To
the contrary, this Note assumes that prosecutors perform their duties with the utmost respect
for the law and the criminal justice system. The point is simply to reiterate that in order to
satisfy the general public that the criminal justice system, and sentencing in particular, is
fair, the legal community needs to step back and assess how the current allocation of
sentencing power might be perceived by an outsider. More importantly, how are they
perceived by the defendants? If the current system does not promote a sense of justice, then
it will continue to undermine any hope of actual faith in the criminal justice system.
400. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (noting that "[i]n order to
dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal
defendant must present 'clear evidence to the contrary."' (quoting United States v. Chem.
Found., 272 U.S.1, 14-15 (1926)).
401. Id. (explaining the Court's hesitation to examine the decision to prosecute and noting
that "[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In essence, a defendant is left
complaining that his word should be believed over that of the prosecutor. This would seem
to be a nearly impossible argument to make.
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is currently no check at all."'402 Allowing the current system of government
motion requirements to continue unchecked violates the very principle
separation of powers was designed to protect-tyranny at the hands of the
government. 403
D. Congress Should Reevaluate the Costs of the Government Triggering
Motion, Recast the § 3553(e) Government Motion Requirement, and Define
Substantial Assistance with Particularity
This Note argues that the current government motion requirement for
substantial assistance violates the separation of powers. However, as the
Second Circuit's reluctance in Vargas to revisit separation of powers
arguments indicates, 404 the most likely source for change is a petition to the
legislature. As prior commentators suggested more than ten years ago, 40 5 in
order to correct the substantial assistance mechanism, Congress should
eliminate the government motion requirement and define with particularity
what behavior is required in order for a defendant to qualify for substantial
assistance.40 6 Given the recent change in control of Congress 40 7 and the
Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it seems that these
proposals were before their time. Under the current regime, the gate
controlling substantial assistance departures is closed until the prosecutor
releases the latch. While this Note certainly respects the specific insight
that prosecutors can give as to whether substantial assistance has been
provided, this Note also asserts that judges are equally qualified to balance
all relevant factors when determining a defendant's sentence. Indeed, it is
certainly true that prosecutors possess unique insight into the usefulness of
a defendant's substantial assistance as well as a collective knowledge across
cases of the validity of a given defendant's specific assistance. But the fact
remains that sometimes prosecutors get it wrong. A system that gets it right
ninety-five percent of the time may be efficiently allocating resources, but
that same system still requires an impartial mechanism to catch the
remaining five percent. The simple fact that the prosecutor is an interested
party makes it nearly impossible for her to police her own decisions.
402. See Barkow, supra note 285, at 1049 (suggesting that separation of powers is
supposed to prevent such unbridled prosecutorial discretion).
403. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 91, at 252 ("Were [the
power to judge] joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence
of an oppressor.").
404. See supra Part II.A.3.
405. See supra Part IB.5.
406. See Lee, supra note 45, at 239-51 (suggesting an elimination of the government
motion requirement, returning sentencing discretion to judges, or in the alternative, crafting
nationwide prosecutorial guidelines); see also Proposal on 5KI. , supra note 26, at 1531-35
(discussing a revision of section 5Kl.1 that would allow the court to depart on either a
motion of the defendant or the government in cases where a defendant has substantially
assisted).
407. See Clemetson, supra note 22 (describing the recent shift in congressional control).
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Our sentencing system accepts (although begrudgingly at times) the
judge as an impartial fact finder, and in cases where there is a question
about a prosecutor's evaluation of the extent of a defendant's substantial
assistance, the judge should be allowed to evaluate the substantial
assistance. Furthermore, in response to concerns that judges might use this
mechanism as a means to circumvent mandatory minimums, 408 the judges'
decisions will still be subject to appellate review. Accordingly, in cases
where the prosecutor's decision is in doubt, Congress should not preclude
the judge from weighing a defendant's substantial assistance simply
because the prosecutor declines to make the motion. Instead, as Justice
Breyer's language in Rita v. United States seems to support, in situations
where she believes that a downward departure based on a defendant's
substantial assistance is appropriate, the judge should be required to
describe with particularity her rationale for granting the departure. 409
To assist the judge in her decision-making process, Congress should
allow the substantial assistance gate to remain open and afford the
prosecutor and the defense the opportunity, possibly in sentencing letters, to
describe to the judge why the gate should or should not be closed. A
reasonable solution should balance prosecutor recommendations with
sentencing judge evaluations to determine whether substantial assistance
was provided and if a subsequent departure is appropriate. 410 At the very
least, the prosecutor should be required to justify with particularity his or
her decision not to provide the defendant with a 5K1.1 letter for substantial
assistance. Because the prosecutor is deeply involved in the adversarial
process by the time substantial assistance recommendations are proffered,
allowing the judge to entertain justifications for and against a departure for
substantial assistance will provide the necessary balance to ensure a just
sentence.
This Note concedes that it may be necessary to limit the circumstances
under which a defendant may move for a downward departure, or even
those under which to afford the prosecutor's recommendation significantly
more weight. Tipping the scales in favor of the government is nothing new.
While not ideal, either of these solutions would still be better than the
current system that requires no justification for a prosecutor's decision and
408. See Lee, supra note 64, at 178 (acknowledging the need for limitations on the
judge's power to depart based on substantial assistance in order to avoid "backdoor"
sentencing). However, unlike Professor Cynthia Lee's initial proposal, which would have
limited the extent to which judges might depart, this Note argues that requiring full
disclosure of the sentencing judge's rationale for departure will act as the appropriate check
on the judge's departure discretion.
409. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (noting that the amount of
detail in a judge's decision depends on the specific circumstances, but that "[t]he sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties'
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority").
410. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) ("[T]he sentencing function
long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches of Government and has
never been thought of as the exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch."); see also
supra Part I.B.2.b.
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precludes any judicial review of a defendant's level of cooperation absent
the government motion. Once again, it is important to note that the idea is
not to provide a back door for the judiciary to sentence below a mandatory
minimum absent compelling reasons, but instead to compel both parties to
justify why a downward departure for substantial assistance is or is not
appropriate.
In order to provide guidance to the judiciary in evaluating substantial
assistance, Congress should define with particularity under what
circumstances a judge may consider a defendant's substantial assistance.
Defining substantial assistance would at the very least promote the idea of
sentencing regularity (one of the original goals of the Sentencing
Guidelines) and would also satisfy detractors who fear the reassertion of
unbridled judicial discretion. While this solution has its own problems-
namely more process and the fine line of protecting decisions that properly
fall within prosecutorial discretion-defining what constitutes substantial
assistance would still be a vast improvement over the unmonitored,
prosecutor-controlled system currently in place. As the recent New York
Times article Judges Look to New Congress for Changes in Mandatory
Sentencing Laws indicates, judges and politicians are expressing dismay at
the results of the current sentencing system. 411  With the shift in
congressional control from Republicans to Democrats, now may be the
appropriate time to revisit who controls sentencing and how to allocate that
great responsibility in order to best protect the individual liberty of criminal
defendants.
CONCLUSION
This Note asserts that the current government motion requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) violates the separation of powers doctrine, from a
formalist or functionalist position. Due to the high stakes of criminal
sentencing for the defendant, it seems wholly unconstitutional and contrary
to the federal system of government to allow the executive branch-an
interested party-to both charge and control the sentence of the defendant.
Placing all the power to trigger a downward departure for cooperation, and
so by default placing nearly total power to sentence in this subset of
mandatory minimum cases, in the hands of prosecutors and the executive
branch violates the fundamental principles of a free constitution by
allowing "the whole power of one department [to be] exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department. ' 412 This Note
advocates heightened disclosure requirements both for prosecutors and
judges during the sentencing process. Requiring prosecutors to submit
concrete reasons for denying a defendant a 5Kli.1 letter will increase
411. See Clemetson, supra note 22 (discussing the new opportunity for sentencing reform
based on the Judiciary Committee's upcoming hearings on the fairness of the one-hundred-
to-one crack-to-cocaine ratio).
412. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 91, at 251.
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scrutiny of a prosecutor's decision making but will also serve to restore
some of the trust in the sentencing system.
Courts, however, may be unable to address the problem inherent in
allowing the prosecutor to control when a defendant can receive a
downward departure for substantial assistance.413  While the courts'
reluctance is disappointing, it is understandable given the prominent role
that prosecutorial discretion has achieved in the currently overloaded
criminal justice system. But even absent judicial intervention, it remains
possible for Congress to reexamine sentencing policy. Congress should
recognize the danger to individual liberty inherent in allowing the
prosecutor, an interested party, to choose the charge and determine the
sentence of a criminal defendant. Congress should excise the government
motion requirement for substantial assistance from the Sentencing
Guidelines. This will eliminate the unconstitutional joining of all the power
to charge and sentence and return some or all sentencing discretion to the
judiciary. At the very least, Congress should recast the government motion
requirement to allow for input from both the prosecutor and the sentencing
judge and should require concrete rationales for a prosecutor's refusal to
seek a downward departure for substantial assistance. Furthermore, as
numerous commentators have previously suggested, Congress should
define with particularity what constitutes a defendant's substantial
assistance. This will promote not only the original Sentencing Guidelines'
goal of sentencing regularity, but, as Professor Barkow so aptly pointed
out,4 14 will also serve to protect individual liberty when it is most
vulnerable-during criminal proceedings that could ultimately result in a
permanent loss of that liberty.
413. See supra Part I.B.
414. See supra Part II.B.4.
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